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Objective: The goal of this research is to assess the impact of individual patient financial 
burden on cancer health outcomes 
Methods: In this work we operationalized financial burden as exposure to potentially high 
cost prescription drugs. Data from the SEER-CAHPS survey captured an individual’s self-
reported delay or omission of prescription medication, as well as all-cause and cancer-specific 
mortality. First, we estimated the difference in delay or omission of prescription medication 
using variation in the low-income subsidy (LIS), a proxy for lower exposure to high-cost 
prescription medication. Machine learning algorithms balance LIS and non-LIS groups by 
observable clinical and demographic characteristics. Second, we estimated the increased hazard 
of all-cause and cancer specific death for individuals reporting difference in delay or omission of 
prescription due to cost, compared to those not reporting on the same measure. Balanced groups 
were again created using machine learning propensity scores. Lastly, we simulate the societal-
level impact in the HER2+ breast cancer population comparing LIS-similar interventions at 
different levels of federal poverty line eligibility. 
Results: We found large and significant reductions in the probability of delay or omission 
of prescription medication for LIS beneficiaries compared to non-LIS beneficiaries (up to 75%). 
The result was robust to a number of different specifications and appears to be concentrated in a 
population weighted to look similar to LIS beneficiaries (i.e., a low-income population). Across 
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all cancer sites we estimated an approximately 24% (all-cause) and 50% (cancer-specific) 
increase in mortality risk due to delay or omission of prescription medication resulting from high 
cost burden. Across a range of sensitivity and scenario analyses, we found evidence that a 
program which substantially reduces the cost of prescription medication for persons at or below 
150% FPL, offers a cost-effective societal benefit substantively below conventionally accepted 
willingness to pay thresholds.  
Conclusions: Overall, we found evidence to support the notion that patients delay or omit 
prescription medication when faced with high costs, that these delays or omissions may result in 
higher risk of all-cause and cancer-specific mortality, and that strategies designed reduce cost for 
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Patients navigating a cancer diagnosis and subsequent treatment plan are increasingly 
likely to list financial burden or financial stress among the many challenging considerations 
during their care. How this financial burden affects patient decision making, and ultimately 
outcomes, is not fully understood. In this dissertation, we consider how cancer patients respond 
to reductions in the cost of prescription medication, the effect of this response on outcomes, and 
the societal burden associated with negative effects from financial burden in a specific cancer 
subpopulation. The primary goal of this work is to inform policy decision making related to the 
cost of care for cancer patients by providing robust, population-based estimates of its 
consequences, as well as provide data-informed areas for targeted intervention. To meet these 
goals, this study is organized into three distinct research aims:  
 
 
Aim 1: Estimate the protective effect of the low-income subsidy on delay or omission of 
prescription medication among Medicare beneficiaries with cancer.  
Hypothesis 1: Cancer patients protected from out-of-pocket costs (OOPC) via the low-
income subsidy have a lower probability of delay or omission of prescription medication than 
similar, non-protected patients. 
The joint Medicare/Medicaid low-income subsidy (LIS) program significantly reduces 
the cost of prescription drugs for enrolled beneficiaries. Using the Surveillance Epidemiology 
and End Results Program (SEER) registry linked to Medicare insurance claims and the 
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Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey data, we estimated 
the difference in delay or omission of prescription medication between those on the LIS and not, 
balancing LIS and non-LIS beneficiaries using machine learning propensity methods.  
After achieving good balance on characteristics of LIS and non-LIS groups, we found 
large and significant reductions in the probability of delay or omission of prescription medication 
for LIS beneficiaries compared to non-LIS beneficiaries (up to 75%). The result was robust to a 
number of different specifications and appears to be concentrated in a population weighted to 
look similar to LIS beneficiaries (i.e., a low-income population), with reduced effectiveness in 
the full population.    
 
Aim 2: Estimate the effect of financially-motivated delay or omission prescription 
medication on mortality among Medicare beneficiaries with cancer.  
Hypothesis 2: Cancer patients reporting delay or omission of prescription medication 
due to cost are at higher risk of all-cause and cancer-specific mortality  
Also using the SEER-CAHPS data resource, we estimated the differential hazard of death 
due to any cause, and due to cancer, associated with a delay or omission of prescription 
medication due to cost. Selection into delay/omission is modeled using machine learning 
techniques and adjusted using propensity analysis, as in Aim 1. Results were presented pooled 
and stratified across 5 main cancer sites.  
 Across all cancer sites we estimated an approximately 24% (all-cause) and 50% (cancer-
specific) increase in mortality risk due to delay or omission of prescription medication resulting 
from high cost burden. When stratified by cancer site, we observed heterogeneity ranging from 
no difference in prostate cancer to more than two times the mortality risk in bladder cancer. 
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Aim 3: Estimate the reduction in benefit (to the individual and to society) associated with 
high financial burden for women with early-stage (I/II) HER2+ breast cancer.  
Using estimates from Aim 1 and 2 and focusing on HER2+ early stage breast cancer 
(stage I/II), we estimated the societal loss associated with financial burden attributable to OOPC 
for prescription drugs using a simulated 10,000 women cohort. Two primary mechanisms of 
action of financial harm were explored: excess mortality due to quality of life decrements and 
treatment delay/omission. We compared a setting with no policy intervention on financial burden 
to hypothetical policies corresponding to sliding scale benefits that offer prescription medication 
at near zero cost (similar to LIS program) at different levels of income (as percent of the Federal 
Poverty Line [FPL]).  
The simulation demonstrated considerable loss attributable to high OOPC payments for 
prescription medication; the difference between a setting without any policy intervention and a 
setting with no financial burden (i.e., probability of burden=0 or all OOPC covered) was 
equivalent to more than a full year in perfect health over a 10-year time horizon. Across a range 
of sensitivity and scenario analyses, we found evidence that a program which substantially 
reduces the cost of prescription medication (similar to the LIS) for persons at or below 150% 
FPL, offers a cost-effective societal benefit substantively below conventionally accepted 
willingness to pay thresholds. The increased cost associated with shielding the entire population 
from the cost of prescription medication, however, is likely to be less efficient (more costly and 
lower marginal benefit) than targeted interventions.   
Overall, we found evidence to support the notion that patients delay or omit prescription 
medication when faced with high costs, that these delays or omissions may result in higher risk 
of all-cause and cancer-specific mortality, and that strategies designed reduce cost for targeted 
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populations may provide good value at the societal level. These results have important 
implications for policy. Cost burden in cancer has real and defined consequences that can be 
averted. From a value-based perspective, policy makers should be willing to consider programs 
targeting low to middle income individuals, but also be aware of the limited evidence for 









Large improvements in the treatment and management of cancer have changed how we 
view the disease. While cancer was once a diagnosis with limited evidence-based treatment 
options, the latter half of the 20th century brought surgical, radiological, and pharmacological 
treatment into routine care.1 Coupled with early detection efforts using computed tomography 
and other imaging diagnostics, prognosis and quality of life has improved dramatically as a result 
of technological advancements. Since the late 1990s, a new class of targeted therapies have 
promised even greater benefit with fewer toxic effects.2 At least one potential side effect of 
treatment, however, not commonly measured in clinical trials, threatens to slow years of 
outcomes-driven progress in cancer care: patient financial burden. 
The total cost of cancer has been steadily rising since the 1990s, easily outpacing general 
and medical price inflation.3,4 Rising costs are distributed throughout the healthcare system, from 
private payers, to government, to individual patients.5 Rapidly rising costs are concerning for any 
payer, but for individual patients, the effects can be devastating. Early evidence suggests that 
patients with high financial burden are more likely to file for medical bankruptcy, more likely to 
be emotionally distressed, and more likely to delay or discontinue treatment.6–9 Indeed, the 
debate over high out-of-pocket cost (OOPC) for cancer treatment has made national headlines 
repeatedly over the last 10 years. 
What we know about financial burden falls under three main categories: (1) 
how/where/why it exists, (2) what effects it may have on patient outcomes, and (3) the 
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effectiveness of strategies used to reduce it. The vast majority of current evidence addresses the 
first category, focusing on prevalence and risk factors, though there is some newer evidence 
related to how burden affects patients (the second). The goal of this study is to add to the limited 
evidence one second and third categories above – how financial burden affects outcomes and 




The literature on financial burden and cancer health outcomes is relatively small, but 
growing. We distinguish between studies reporting the specific OOP cost of care from those that 
attempt to connect high cost with patient outcomes or experience including quality of life, 
adherence to treatment, or other related cancer outcomes. The latter is the focus of this review, 
but where important (and especially in early years), we reference more descriptive cost studies, 
as they can help provide context to the problem.  
Literature for this review is gathered using both search strategy (searching within 
PubMed and Google Scholar) as well as a secondary scan from references of known/identified 
related sources and systematic reviews. At least two recent systematic reviews (2016, 2017) have 
been published on financial burden/financial toxicity (discussed below). We focus discussion 
here to studies conducted within the US.  
Much of the early literature on financial burden in cancer focused on describing costs 
across different populations. Chang and colleagues, noting that many of the existing ‘burden of 
disease’ estimates came from national surveys, estimated direct medical costs from private 
insurance claims from 1998-2000.10 Yabroff and colleagues duplicated these findings in 
SEER/Medicare data in 2008, showing additionally, how different ‘phases’ of care (i.e., 
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diagnosis, continuing, and last year of life) can have substantially different cost.11 Langa and co-
authors were among the first to focus exclusively on cancer OOP costs for elderly individuals, 
using data from the 1995 Asset and Health Dynamics Study.12 Unsurprisingly, these authors 
found substantial OOP cost for patients especially in the area of prescription medications (data 
prior to Part D benefit plans). Not long after, cancer site specific OOP cost estimates began to 
emerge, starting with common sites such as prostate and breast cancers.13,14 In one of the first 
studies linking what a patient might pay for cancer treatment to outcomes such as receipt of care, 
screening and survival, Ward and colleagues used data from the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS) from 1991 to 2004 to estimate differences in outcomes by insurance status 
among cancer patients. The authors presented their findings acknowledging heavy limitations in 
the complex relationship between insurance health outcomes.7  
With the introduction of Part D in 2006, the realized cost to Medicare beneficiaries for 
prescription drugs changed dramatically. Knowledge about the program and its costs were 
limited, especially in early years. One (non-cancer specific) study demonstrated a substantial 
knowledge gap for patients, as well as more than a quarter who reported cost-coping strategies 
even after they secured coverage.15 The American Society For Clinical Oncology (ASCO) issued 
national guidance on the cost of cancer care in 2009 as a response to increased interest, and to 
policy changes such as Part D coverage.16 This guidance included recommendations to discuss 
cost as an important component of cancer care, to educate patients and physicians, and to fund 
research to help the cancer community understand factors associated with cost burden.17 
Following the ASCO guidance, investigators began to look more deeply at the 
relationship between high cost and health-related outcomes in cancer. A number of studies 
provide additional and updated estimates of OOP cost.18–23 Markman and colleagues (2010) used 
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a patient convenience sample survey to understand the impact of the cost of cancer treatment on 
outcomes. Overall they found that almost 40% of patients with household incomes less than 
$40,000 report a “large amount of distress” as a result of cancer treatment bills.24 Hofstatter 
(2010) found virtually no evidence on patient-communication about cost prior to 2009.25 
Henrikson and colleagues sought to correct the lack of evidence with a 2014 qualitative study 
around patient-physician communication and costs in cancer. They found willingness on both 
sides to discuss costs, but a significant barrier in access to reliable and patient-specific 
estimates.26 In a 2012 study, a group of authors described risk factors associated with financial 
toxicity in colon cancer patients, including total income and stage of diagnosis. Similar to other 
studies they found a significant proportion of patients on elected treatment experience financial 
hardship (38%).27 Describing an important link between treatment discontinuation and high 
financial burden, Kasiaeng and colleagues used Medicare claims data to estimate up to 20% 
increase in the likelihood of discontinuation for patients with higher cost burden.9 Neuner used 
the low-income subsidy program to identify differences in adherence for aromatase inhibitors.17 
In a large multi-period pilot study using a convenience sample of insured diagnosed 
cancer patients, Zafar and colleagues found a wide range of financially induced disruptions to 
daily living and optimal care. Patients cut back on leisure activities (68%), reduced spending in 
other areas (46%), used less than the prescribed amount of medication (20%), partially filled 
prescriptions (19%), and avoiding filling prescriptions altogether (24%).6 Researchers have also 
attempted to estimate changes in patient decision making as a result of high financial burden. 
Wong and colleagues (2013) and Fung and colleagues (2013) both looked at tradeoffs and 
patient response to treatment costs, finding in general that higher (relative to income) cost burden 
resulted in higher likelihood of selecting less efficacious treatment.28,29  
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More recently, researchers have begun to examine how specific subpopulations react to 
cost burden. Crouch and colleagues studied the difference between rural and urban costs for end 
of life care for cancer patients.30 Another study suggests that younger rural patients are more 
likely to forgo medical care than urban counterparts.31 Wheeler and colleagues found interesting 
associations between financial burden and race that were largely attenuated when controlling for 
socioeconomic status.32 Overall, there appears to be a predictable pattern of increased cost 
burden associated with minority or disadvantaged populations.  
Lastly, a much smaller number of studies have attempted to link financial burden to hard 
outcomes, specifically mortality. Tucker-Seeley used the Health and Retirement Study data from 
1996-2004 to suggest associations between cost and mortality in older adults (prior to part D and 
non-cancer specific).33 Using a more rigorous design focused exclusively on cancer patients, 
Ramsey and colleagues provided perhaps the strongest evidence to date of an association 
between financial hardship in cancer and mortality. With Washington state bankruptcy records 
linked to the Washington SEER Cancer Registry, the authors demonstrated a risk up to 2.65 
times greater for patients diagnosed with cancer of filing for bankruptcy, compared to those 
without cancer.34 In the follow-up study (2016), propensity score matching on cases of 
bankruptcy identified in the prior work (vs no bankruptcy – all cancer patients) was used to 
estimate a relative hazard of death of 1.79 [95% CI: 1.64, 1.96].35  
At least two studies reviewed the available evidence on financial burden and financial 
toxicity in cancer.36,37 The bulk of their findings are discussed above (non-US studies have been 
excluded). Both conclude that financial burden is a significant issue affecting a large proportion 
of cancer survivors, across multiple types of insurance. It is worth noting, as the authors do, the 
lack of standardization for measures of financial toxicity, and the development of a patient-
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reported instrument surrounding financial burden: the COST measure.38 The measure was 
developed in cancer patients and may help to standardize measures across studies, but to date, 
has few applications. Gordon and colleagues also made note of a specific need for improved 
evidence on long-term adherence and financial toxicity.  
While not providing empirical estimates themselves, it is worth noting that in addition to 
the estimates provided above, recent years have seen a number of calls to action and 
commentating pieces offering insight into patient financial toxicity from multiple 
perspectives.8,39–43 Recommendations include longer term policy-oriented solutions, changes in 
insurance design and reimbursement, and heightened awareness by physicians and patients.   
 
Significance, Contribution, and Innovation 
 
The cost of cancer care has received considerable public attention over the last 10-15 
years.44 More and more, patients, their families, and their providers are recognizing financial 
burden itself as an adverse effect of cancer treatment, similar to other treatment ‘toxicities’. 
Unfortunately, medical care costs are largely unknown at the time of treatment planning, leaving 
patients confused, or unable to tell if they can afford recommended treatment.6,26  
The literature connecting cost burden to cancer health outcomes is growing rapidly, but 
not without limitation and areas of need. Currently, a large amount of the evidence on patient 
well-being or patient reported outcomes are based on convenience samples or smaller local 
surveys. Larger, more nationally representative studies could help confirm findings from earlier 
work. As noted by at least one review, the evidence surrounding some intermediate outcomes, 
such as adherence and discontinuation has both sample size and longevity limitations. There is 
also a distinct lack of evidence surrounding ‘hard’ outcomes such as mortality (all-cause and 
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cancer-specific) or progression of disease. The links from financial burden to these hard 
endpoints has been largely suggested, but not well tested in a cancer population.39 One important 
study looking at all-cause mortality used a single mechanism – bankruptcy – to strengthen the 
design, but other mechanisms should be explored. No studies that we aware of attempt to 
associate high financial burden with cancer-specific mortality.  
Another large limitation of the existing evidence, and consistent barrier to additional 
studies, is the large degree of selection into patterns of care. Costs are generally not randomly 
assigned, and thus differential outcomes observed are difficult to attribute with certainty to the 
burden of cost itself, and not to other correlated disease or social factors. Robust study designs 
and statistical methods are needed to test findings under different assumptions, with attempts to 
control for selection into ‘treatment’ (i.e., high cost).  
Finally, virtually no information exists about the impact financial burden may have on 
greater societal well-being. Cost-effectiveness and economic evaluation in cancer is common and 
useful for making average treatment decisions based on value derived in the ‘ideal’ setting. 
These estimates, however, often fail to account for individual ability to pay or other downstream 
consequences of financial burden. Without the ability to project an expected attributable societal 
loss due to cost burden, it is difficult to determine the level and target of appropriate intervention. 
In general, the impact of financial burden on societal benefit has not been quantified. Additional 
work is needed to understand if these consequences can alter societal-level decision making 
either in specific subgroups, or even on a population as a whole.  
This research also offers innovation in a number of areas. Specifically, the combination and 
use of multiple rich data sources, a rigorous statistical design and novel data-science methods, 
and a value-based policy-oriented simulation offer a clear and original contribution to health 
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services cancer care. In cancer, estimates of the cost of care have traditionally faced a tradeoff 
between a large sample, rich disease-focused data source (e.g., registry data, such as SEER) vs. a 
smaller sample in a survey with direct questions to patients about cost. In this study, we use a 
rich linked data source which combines detailed cancer specific information, Medicare claims, 
and patient-reported survey measures. This data resource is relatively new (available 2016) and 
provides insights not previously available from single data sources previously. 
Another shortcoming in the literature surrounding burden of cost in cancer care is one of 
selection. It is difficult separate the effect of financial burden on outcomes from individual 
choice, comorbid illness, or disease severity. Sicker individuals, for example, tend to incur 
higher cost, and experience worse outcomes. This study, benefiting from the richness and 
variability of data sources uses novel data science and machine learning methods to help account 
for this selection. Machine learning methods are a loose collection of computational algorithms 
that search for multifaceted relationships in pursuit of high-performance prediction, and are well-
suited for settings with complex relationships and potentially large number of covariates 
(predictors). The use of these methods is still relatively uncommon, but offers an innovative 
opportunity to tackle a difficult confounding problem in a different way.   
Finally, much of the public conversation about the cost of cancer care skirts around 
discussions about value. Value is an historically complex and difficult topic in medicine. Still, it 
plays an important role in policy decision making. This study uses an innovative approach to 
value assessment and economic evaluation – one which challenges the ‘ability to pay’ 
assumption and accounts for potential harmful effects of financial toxicity. As evidence showing 
the adverse effects of financial toxicity grows, the conversation surrounding value becomes more 





Figure 1 shows a conceptual model adapted from Zafar and colleagues.40 The model 
relates high financial burden to cancer health outcomes and ultimately mortality. More 
specifically, the model hypothesizes a direct relationship between high financial burden and a 
patient’s treatment-related choices (discontinuation, delay, decision to take or omit treatment 
altogether), health-related quality of life, and quality of care. Financial burden has a relationship 
to mortality and recurrence or disease progression through the mediating factors. Aim 1 of this 
study focuses specifically on the effect of the LIS program, which reduces OOPC for 
prescription drugs on treatment-related outcomes. Aim 2 provides an empirical estimate of the 
relationship between financially-motivated delay of prescription medication and mortality. Aim 
3 combines all aspects of the conceptual model into simulation of the impact to society from high 





The objective of this study is to better understand the impact of cost exposure for patients 
living with cancer by: (1) estimating the impact of reduced cost for prescription medication on 
delay or omission of medication; (2) estimating the association between delays or omission of 
medication due specifically to cost on all-cause and cancer-specific mortality; and (3) tabulating 





Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
 






CHAPTER 2: HIGH COST BURDEN AND DELAY OR OMISSION OF 
PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION: A MACHINE LEARNING APPLICATION 
 
Overview 
Background: The cost of care remains a significant barrier to guideline-recommended 
treatment in cancer, as well as a significant burden to patients and their families. Population-
based estimates are needed to estimate the effects of out-of-pocket cost protection on medication 
delays or omission. 
Objective: To estimate the effect of out-of-pocket cost protection for prescription 
medication, proxied by the joint Medicare/Medicaid Low-Income Subsidy (LIS) program, on 
delay or failure to initiate prescription medication for Medicare beneficiaries with cancer (lung, 
breast, prostate, bladder, or colorectal).  
Methods: We use a three-way link between SEER cancer registry, Medicare claims, and 
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems survey to estimate average 
treatment effects (ATE) and average effects of treatment among the treated (ATT) of LIS. Using 
machine-learning algorithms we first predict low-cost exposure, via the LIS, as a function of, 
cancer-specific characteristics, and diagnosis codes from claims. Applying stabilized propensity 
weights to adjust for observed differences between LIS and non-LIS participants, we predict self-
reported differential risk of delay or omission of prescribed medication. 
Results: The sample included 6,889 Medicare fee-for-service cancer patients diagnosed 
between 2007 and 2015. Thirteen percent of non-LIS participants (N=5,125) and 15% of LIS 
participants (N=1,744) report delaying or omitting medications because of cost. Machine 
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learning algorithms balance covariates well (mean standardized difference 5-7%). For LIS 
compared to non-LIS participants, medication omission or delay was -8.3 [95% CI: -11.6, -5.0] 
percentage points lower in the ATT estimates, and -3.5 [-6.1, -0.1] lower in the ATE estimates in 
preferred models. Results were similar across a range of specifications and sensitivity analyses 
but varied considerably by cancer site; breast and colorectal patients had the largest average 
reduction in medication delay or omission as a result of lower cost burden.  
Conclusions: Out-of-pocket cost protection offered by the LIS may significantly reduce 
the likelihood of omission or delays to prescription medication for Medicare beneficiaries with 




Coupled with early detection efforts, surgical, radiological, and pharmacological 
treatment have dramatically altered prognosis and quality of life for patients with cancer in the 
last 50 years.1 At least one potential side effect of treatment not commonly measured in clinical 
trials, however, threatens to slow years of outcomes-driven progress: patient financial burden. In 
recent years, conversations focused on the ‘financial toxicity’ of cancer care have made the 
cancer community more aware of the toll financial burden can have on cancer patients and 
cancer survivors.8,45 Early work has demonstrated an association between financial burden and 
quality of life, discontinuation of treatment, and mortality.9,46,47 
The majority of evidence on financial burden in cancer comes from convenience samples, 
most of which have been used to quantify the extent of the problem. Two recent systematic 
reviews of financial toxicity highlighted the focus on quantifying the problem using both 
objective and subjective measures of burden.37,48 In general, population-based evidence of the 
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effect of financial burden on outcomes, both intermediate (e.g., failure to receive or delay 
treatment) and long-term (e.g., disease progression/mortality), is sparse.   
Confounding also currently plagues the financial burden literature. It is difficult to 
separate the effect of financial strain on outcomes from competing clinical or social risk factors 
often associated with worse outcomes.49 The problem does not lack for data, however. Claims, 
registry, and survey data are robust in cancer populations. An environment with complex inter-
dependent relationships and rich data is ripe for machine learning (ML) methods, a loose 
collection of computational algorithms that search for multifaceted relationships in pursuit of 
high-performance prediction.  
This study focuses on the intermediate outcome of access to prescription medication, an 
important marker for long-term outcomes in cancer care.50 Though not the only barrier to access, 
cost and financial considerations are frequently reported by patients as prohibitive to 
recommended treatment.51,52 We examined the differential impact of cost exposure on 
medication delay or omission in patients with cancer, applying ML methods to balance between 
exposed and unexposed groups. We used low-income subsidy (LIS) participation – a proxy for 
significant protections against high-cost prescription medication – as our primary exposure. In a 
propensity balanced sample, we tested whether cancer patients with LIS, and accordingly lower 




We used a retrospective cohort of cancer patients to assess the impact of high cost 
exposure on delays or failure to initiate prescribed medications. The approach accounts for 
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differences in selection into the LIS program using the potential outcomes framework and ML-
generated propensity scores. 
 
Data 
Data for this study come from a unique three-way linkage of the Surveillance, 
Epidemiology, and End Results Program (SEER) Cancer registry53, fee-for-service (FFS) 
Medicare claims, and the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) 
survey.54 The linkage contains a rich set of demographic, clinical, and utilization-based 
covariates often lacking from survey, claims, or registry data alone. We included data from all 
three sources from 2007-2015 (with claims dating back to 2002). In addition, we merged area-
level socio-demographic and poverty measures from the American Community Survey (ACS) at 
the Census Tract level. 
 
Cancer Sample   
 
The full SEER sample contained individuals diagnosed with five major cancers (lung, 
breast, prostate, bladder, or colorectal). The merged sample included SEER-CAHPS matched 
Medicare FFS patients diagnosed with cancer prior to and within five years prior to their CAHPS 
survey date. To allow for a history of claims, individuals must have completed a survey in 2007 
or later with at least two years of continuous prior FFS enrollment. For classification, we used 






The primary outcome of interest was a self-reported measure of delay or failure to fill 
prescription, a binary response to the query: “In the last 6 months, did you ever delay or not fill a 
prescription because you felt that you could not afford it?” The wording helps define a short time 
window that improves confidence in the co-occurrence of our outcome and exposure. The 
question also focuses on delays made exclusive to cost-specific barriers, eliminating the need to 
separate delay or omission of prescription medication not attributable to cost. This outcome 
measure was available for all survey years 2007-2015.    
 
Exposure 
We used as our primary exposure, LIS enrollment - a proxy for significant protections 
against high-cost prescription medication. The LIS is a joint Medicare-Medicaid administered 
program intended to offer prescription medication to needy individuals at zero or near-zero cost. 
Eligibility pertains to 150% of the Federal Income Poverty Level (FPL) and below, subject to 
additional minimum asset requirements. Since the LIS is a Part D (prescription drug benefit) 
program, we restricted our primary sample to Part D beneficiaries. The LIS was determined by 
the Medicare enrollment file (i.e., not a self-reported measure).  
 
Covariates  
SEER provided measures of cancer site, stage, grade, date of diagnosis, SEER region, 
surgical treatment, and radiation. CAHPS provided socio-demographic characteristics including 
age, sex, race/ethnicity, education level, marital status, needing a proxy (help) to complete 
survey, smoking status, and urban/rural status. Medicare claims identified individual ICD-9 
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classified diagnoses, up to five years prior to survey completion. The ICD-9 codes were 
categorized into 285 clinical classifications using the AHRQ Clinical Classification Software 
(CCS) for comorbidity.55,56 Area-level measures of percent black, white, and Hispanic ethnicity, 
as well as educational attainment, median income, population density, and the percent of 
individuals living below poverty were included at the Census Tract level.  
 
Design and Analysis 
Because we expected a considerable amount of selection into exposure, we attempted to 
balance treated (LIS=1) and control (LIS=0) groups using the potential outcomes framework 
developed by Rubin and inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW).57 How we applied 
weights determined the specific counterfactual being estimated: the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT), or the average treatment effect (ATE).57,58 In this setting, the ATT, which 
focuses on effects among those most likely to receive the LIS, may be more appropriate than the 
ATE, which estimates effects in the full population.  
To estimate the desired potential outcomes, we first attempted to flexibly account for 
differences in treatment assignment. We used ML methods that apply a ‘learning’ algorithm to 
prediction, allow a large number of predictors (e.g., interaction and higher order terms), and rely 
less on functional form.59–62 We tested three popular ML algorithms, each of which, in their 
simplest form, split observations into high-dimensional, mutually exclusive groups to generate 
predictions (referred to as ‘trees’): Classification And Regression Trees (CART), Random 
Forest, and Gradient Boosted Machines (GBM). CART is rarely used in practice due to its overly 
simplistic, high variability (it builds just one ‘tree’), but included for comparison purposes. 
Random Forest and GBM both average results over many trees to reduce variability.61,63 We 
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used a 5-fold cross-validation out-of-bag sampling procedure to tune ML models.64 Area under 
the receiver operating curve (AUC) and Cohen’s kappa were used as performance metrics 
(tuning details provided in Supplement B). All machine learning models included as predictors 
all available covariates, including the full list of 285 diagnosis codes from the CCS, coded as 1 if 
captured in the last five years, and 0 otherwise.  
Tuned ML algorithms produced a predicted probability of treatment for the LIS and 
prescription insurance exposures, respectively. These probabilities were converted to a 
propensity weight according to the specific effect estimate of interest (ATT or ATE), and 
‘stabilized’ to reduce variance.65 For comparison, we also estimated models with propensity 
scores built from a logistic regression first stage model on a limited set of covariates (no 
interactions and without the full CCI claims codes). Graphically, we demonstrate the reduction in 
standardized difference (?̅?#$%&#'%(# − ?̅?*+(#$+,/𝜎/) across a range of selected covariates to 
demonstrate suitable balance. Outcome models were estimated using weighted logistic 
regression that also controlled for socio-demographic and cancer-specific covariates (doubly 
robust). Treatment effects were presented as marginal effects (risk differences) for each of the 
three different ML algorithm-generated propensity scores. We conducted sensitivity analyses to 
demonstrate the robustness of our results across missing data specifications, including ML 
selection of missing category, complete case, and multiple imputation.66 Analyses were 
conducted using R v3.5.1 and Stata 15. 
 
Subgroup and Sensitivity Analyses  
In addition to primary analyses, we explored four alternative specifications. First, we 
report estimates stratified by cancer site; since clinical guidelines offer different treatment 
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recommendations for different sites, we expect our effects may be heterogenous as well. Second, 
we restricted the sample to individuals with a cancer diagnosis within two years of survey 
response to mimic a “newly-diagnosed” cohort. Third, we limited the sample to individuals 
living in the lower 50th percentile of Census Tract poverty status observed in our data (~11% of 
FPL). This approach creates a more homogenous sample which may improve balance.  
 
Results 
The primary sample included 6,869 cancer patients diagnosed between 2007 and 2015 
(Supplement A). Unweighted, approximately 34% participated in the LIS at the time of survey 
and nearly 14% overall report having delayed or failed to initiate a prescription medication in the 
six months preceding their survey response (Table 1). LIS participants were approximately two 
percentage points more likely to delay or omit prescription medication than those not on the LIS. 
LIS participants were also less likely to have a college education, more likely to be minority 
race, and considerably less likely to be married.  
ML algorithms predict LIS status using covariates from Table 1 as well as individual 
CCS codes from claims. In general, both Random Forest and GBM algorithms predict LIS status 
well, with race, education, and marital status were among the strongest predictors of LIS status. 
Additional fit statistics, propensity distributions, and details for ML algorithms are found in 
Supplement B-C. Though not a guarantee of bias reduction59, weighted standardized differences 
between LIS and non-LIS participants were reduced from up to 80% in some cases to below 10% 
on average in all model specifications (Figure 2).  
In propensity-balanced groups, we estimated the difference in the predicted probability of 
medication delay or omission for those with and without the LIS (Table 2, odds ratio estimates 
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presented in supplemental materials [Table 5]). Overall, after balancing, the LIS was shown to be 
protective against medication delay or omission. The primary ATT effect (i.e., within a 
population weighted to look similar to LIS participants) was strongly negative, statistically 
different from zero at the 1% level, and similar across all propensity specifications (GBM: -8.4 
[95%CI: -12.0, -4.7]). ATE estimates (i.e., within a population weighted to look like the full 
sample) were also similar across specifications, negative, and statistically different from zero, 
but attenuated compared to ATT estimates. 
Figure 3 confirms considerable heterogeneity by site, with strong negative and significant 
effects for breast and colorectal cancers and negative but smaller associations and larger standard 
errors for bladder and lung (with smaller samples). Prostate cancer was the only non-negative 
ATE. 
 
Additional sensitivity analyses 
Restricting the sample to patients diagnosed with cancer within 2 years of their survey 
date (“newly diagnosed”) produced very similar estimates to the main findings (Table 3, Model 
1). Similarly, alternative missing data specifications, complete case analysis and logit-propensity 
multiple imputation, all were consistent (Table 3, Models 2-3).  
When we restricted our sample to the lower half of census tracts by percent living under 
the FPL, the magnitude of the association increased in both ATT and ATE models, compared to 
the full sample (ATE: -6.3 [-9.7, -2.8]; ATT: -9.9 [-14.1, -5.6]). To further demonstrate the 
strength of this association, we plot the predicted likelihood of medication delay/omission for 
LIS and non-LIS groups in the full sample, at different values of Census Tract Poverty (Figure 
4). Whereas LIS participants experience a mostly constant risk of medication delay across 
 
 24 
poverty levels, risk of delay/omission was substantially increased for non-LIS individuals living 
in the most vulnerable areas.  
 
Discussion 
Financial burden may be a significant barrier to guideline recommended care for some 
cancer patients. In this study, we use the Low-Income Subsidy program, intended to eliminate or 
drastically reduce the cost of prescription drugs, as a measure of reduced medication cost burden 
to individuals. Because the program is available only to low-income individuals who may 
otherwise receive less than optimal care, we employ a machine-learning propensity-adjusted 
approach to effect estimation.  
 In general, we find large and significant reductions in the likelihood of delay or omission 
of medication for those protected by the LIS. Depending on the specific estimator used, 
differences range from four to ten percentage points, or a 22-75% in reduction medication delay 
or omission relative to the baseline likelihood (13.5%). Our findings are robust to a number of 
different specifications and sensitivity results, different ML algorithms to predict treatment, and 
alternative approaches to missing data. We presented both ATE and ATT estimates to 
demonstrate how effects may vary across selected (LIS) and full populations. In our primary 
models, ATT estimates were 2-3 times larger than ATE estimates, suggesting a potentially low 
likelihood of benefit for those not eligible to receive the LIS – an arguably less needy group at 
baseline based on LIS income and asset eligibility thresholds.  
 A strength of this study includes its use of novel machine learning algorithms to non-
parametrically predict LIS participation using a large number of predictors. These algorithms are 
not a perfect solution; each is only as good as the data provided, and unobserved factors remain 
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uncontrolled. But the ability to make use of information from many covariates, interactions, and 
higher order terms systematically, and divorced from instigator biases, is appealing. Importantly, 
some have cautioned the research community when using ML approaches for causal 
inference.62,63 Our approach in this study separates prediction from inference. The goal of the 
propensity score with or without ML techniques is to use accurate prediction to balance treated 
and control groups. Such a task is well-suited for supervised ML techniques like those used here.  
 We include a number of policy-relevant sensitivity analyses in our study. First, we 
considered heterogenous treatment effects by cancer site. Substantial variation in effect by 
cancer site is consistent with the proposed mechanism of action for the LIS. In particular, we 
highlight the case of prostate cancer, an area where the vast majority of diagnosed patients are 
under no recommended guidelines that include pharmacologic treatment, and where we observe 
no average treatment effect. Contrast this to breast cancer, where clinical recommendations 
include sometimes expensive hormonal endocrine therapy.67 Here we observed consistent 
negative ATE and ATT differences – reductions between 5 and 10 percentage points.  
 We also find that those living in poor census tract areas appear to experience a larger 
benefit to prescription medication cost protection (more than 60% larger ATE than the full 
sample estimates). This finding is consistent with our expectation that higher income individuals 
are likely to benefit less from programs that reduce cost. Differential access to care contributes to 
cancer care disparities and lessens the population impact of technology advancement.68 We are 
careful to note that ‘burden’ as defined in the financial toxicity literature takes many forms and 




 This work contributes to a growing literature on costs and financial burden in cancer care. 
Kaisaeng and colleagues used Medicare claims to estimate discontinuation of chemotherapy 
among patients who initiated treatment.9 Consistent with our findings, they observed that 
discontinuation may be 20% higher for patients who experience larger costs, but they are limited 
by what they can see from the material patient burden in FFS Medicare claims. A number of 
studies have used NHIS survey data to report ‘forgoing medical care’ due to cost in 10-30% of 
the cancer population.31,51,71 Similarly, in a pilot study of 254 cancer patients, Zafar and 
colleagues reported significant patient response to cost burden, including 20% who took less than 
the prescribed amount of medication, 19% who partially filled prescriptions, and 24% who 
avoided filling prescriptions altogether.6 Our findings are consistent with these studies, but 
extend this work by estimating differences across treated and control groups. A considerable 
amount of research has focused on the psychological or quality of life burden associated with 
high cost burden,69,72 an aspect that may be substantially intertwined with the estimated treatment 
response.   
This work contains a number of limitations. First, we are unable to account for 
unobserved factors that may confound our primary estimate. Health literacy, trust in the 
healthcare system, care coordination, and frailty may all effect the relationship between LIS and 
the likelihood of delay or omission of prescription medication beyond what we are able to 
control. A narrowly defined outcome, the use of advanced learning algorithms, and the direction 
of expected unobserved bias (positive [unadjusted estimates suggest LIS is harmful to the 
likelihood of delay or omission]), however, all contribute to confidence in our results. Second, 
results may not generalize beyond the Medicare population, though other work has demonstrated 
financial burden in other populations as well.6,23 Third, our estimates of medication delay may 
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not be specific to cancer drugs. Even so, we see non-cancer drug response as itself a potentially 
interesting finding. If patients are prioritizing cancer treatment yet delaying diabetes medication, 
this can also contribute negative health consequences. Finally, we were not able to standardize 
our measure of ‘delay.’ A self-reported measure is important, but is difficult to quantify in terms 
of potential for harm without further investigation.  
 A number of active and conceived policies and practices seek to curb patient individual 
cost burden. The hotly debated practice of pharmaceutical couponing (not available to Medicare 
beneficiaries) offers a similar benefit.73 Many individual states cap the out-of-pocket cost 
charges for private insurance plans or require ‘parity’ in coverage between infused and oral 
medications – provisions that often target the cancer community specifically.74 Our research 
supports the notion that these programs are likely to be effective in protecting access for some 
individuals. In addition, although we are unable to make direct statements about costs not 
attributable to prescription medication, it is not inconceivable that patients could react similarly 
to treatment covered by other benefits, such as surgery, radiation, or oncology visits. Without 
supplemental insurance, original Medicare covers 80% of costs, leaving a large portion 
unaccounted for. Nationally, prescription drugs make up less than 15% of total healthcare costs, 
and though drugs make easy targets, patients face financial burden across the spectrum of 
healthcare services.75 Not considered here, is the cost of such programs to society. These 
estimates are only one half of the value equation; how much, and more importantly who is 






Increased cost exposure to prescription medication among Medicare beneficiaries with 
cancer may lead to delay or failure to initiate treatment. Such effects are likely to be 
heterogenous by cancer site. The impact these delays or failure to initiate may have on more 
downstream outcomes, such as mortality, or the total value loss associated with these and other 





Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Selected Sample Descriptive Statistics (unweighted) 
 No LIS (N=5125) LIS (N=1744) p 
Delay filling prescribed medicines 670 (13.1%) 260 (14.9%) 0.053 
Age Category   <0.001 
   <69 1242 (24.2%) 704 (40.4%)  
   70-74 1333 (26.0%) 380 (21.8%)  
   75-79 1133 (22.1%) 297 (17.0%)  
   80-84 835 (16.3%) 209 (12.0%)  
   85+ 582 (11.4%) 154 (8.8%)  
Male Gender 2762 (53.9%) 721 (41.3%) <0.001 
Race   <0.001 
   White 4494 (87.7%) 956 (54.8%)  
   Black 246 (4.8%) 353 (20.2%)  
   Other 245 (4.8%) 164 (9.4%)  
   Hispanic 140 (2.7%) 271 (15.5%)  
Education   <0.001 
   Some HS, no grad 647 (12.6%) 795 (45.6%)  
   HS grad 1473 (28.7%) 465 (26.7%)  
   Some college 1243 (24.3%) 258 (14.8%)  
   College+ 1621 (31.6%) 141 (8.1%)  
   Missing 141 (2.8%) 85 (4.9%)  
Marital Status   <0.001 
   Married 3311 (64.6%) 562 (32.2%)  
   Sep/Divorce 334 (6.5%) 322 (18.5%)  
   Widowed 810 (15.8%) 400 (22.9%)  
   Never Married 308 (6.0%) 339 (19.4%)  
   Missing 362 (7.1%) 121 (6.9%)  
Region   <0.001 
   Northeast 1048 (20.4%) 259 (14.9%)  
   West 2295 (44.8%) 735 (42.1%)  
   Midwest 601 (11.7%) 172 (9.9%)  
   South 1181 (23.0%) 578 (33.1%)  
Someone helped you complete survey 479 (11.7%) 427 (35.7%) <0.001 
Smoking Status   <0.001 
   Every day 269 (5.2%) 214 (12.3%)  
   Some Days 137 (2.7%) 133 (7.6%)  
   Not at all 4664 (91.0%) 1363 (78.2%)  
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   Missing 55 (1.1%) 34 (1.9%)  
Urban/Rural   <0.001 
   Metro        4145 (80.9%) 1357 (77.8%)  
   High Urban 375 (7.3%) 103 (5.9%)  
   Low Urban 502 (9.8%) 214 (12.3%)  
   Rural 103 (2.0%) 70 (4.0%)  
Cancer Site at Diagnosis   <0.001 
   Bladder 444 (8.7%) 108 (6.2%)  
   Breast 1596 (31.1%) 619 (35.5%)  
   Colorectal 755 (14.7%) 339 (19.4%)  
   Lung 474 (9.2%) 219 (12.6%)  
   Prostate 1856 (36.2%) 459 (26.3%)  
Cancer Stage at Diagnosis   0.015 
   In Situ (Stage 0) 636 (12.4%) 215 (12.3%)  
   Stage I 1680 (32.8%) 549 (31.5%)  
   Stage II 1996 (38.9%) 632 (36.2%)  
   Stage III 501 (9.8%) 201 (11.5%)  
   Stage IV 228 (4.4%) 102 (5.8%)  
   Missing 84 (1.6%) 45 (2.6%)  
Cancer Grade at Diagnosis   0.37 
   Grade 1 590 (11.5%) 186 (10.7%)  
   Grade 2 2269 (44.3%) 720 (41.3%)  
   Grade 3 1556 (30.4%) 545 (31.3%)  
   Grade 4 156 (3.0%) 45 (2.6%)  
   Missing 554 (10.8%) 248 (14.2%)  
Surgery on Primary Tumor 3606 (70.8%) 1238 (71.7%) 0.48 
Radiation on Primary Tumor 1833 (35.8%) 594 (34.1%) 0.20 
Comorbidities, mean (SD) 6.3 (3.6) 7.9 (3.9) <0.001 
Census Tract Covariates    
Median Income, mean (SD) 67664.5 (28219.0) 52226.3 (22256.4) <0.001 
Density, mean (SD) 3377.7 (4741.1) 4761.2 (8074.1) <0.001 
Pct Whites, mean (SD) 76.1 (21.1) 67.9 (24.4) <0.001 
Pct Blacks, mean (SD) 8.9 (15.3) 15.8 (22.6) <0.001 
Pct Hispanics, mean (SD) 12.1 (14.1) 18.9 (21.6) <0.001 
Pct Non-HS Grads, mean (SD) 11.8 (8.1) 18.8 (11.0) <0.001 
Pct HS Only, mean (SD) 26.4 (10.2) 29.3 (9.3) <0.001 
Pct Some College, mean (SD) 29.6 (7.3) 28.6 (6.9) <0.001 
Pct College, mean (SD) 32.2 (16.9) 23.4 (14.6) <0.001 
Pct below poverty, mean (SD) 11.9 (8.2) 18.4 (11.3) <0.001 
*LIS=low-income subsidy; HS=high school; SD=standard deviation, p-value is from chi-square tests for categorical covariates and t-test for 
continuous covariates.  
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Figure 2. Standardized Differences (LIS vs. No LIS) for Selected Covariates by Propensity 
Weight  
 
*LIS=low-income subsidy; GBM=gradient booted machine; CART=classification and regression trees. The standardized 
difference is the [weighted] mean in the treated (LIS) minus the mean in the untreated groups divided by the pool standard 


















































Surgery on Primary Tumor
Radiation on Primary Tumor
Sum of comorbidities
Census Tract Median Income
Census Tract Density
Census Tract Pct Whites
Census Tract Pct Blacks
Census Tract Pct Hispanics
Pct HS only (Tract)
Pct College Educ (Tract)
Pct below poverty (Tract)






Table 2. Propensity Adjusted Predicted Difference in Medication Delay or Omission 
between LIS and Non-LIS participants 
     























N 6869 6869 6869 6869 
     
*Statistically significant at p= **0.05, ***0.001 
LIS=low-income subsidy; GBM=gradient booted machine; CART=classification and regression trees. 
Estimates are presented as predicted risk differences calculated from the differential effect of LIS vs. No LIS from 
propensity adjusted logistic regression models using method of recycled predictions and delta method standard 
errors. Treatment on the treated estimates weight untreated individuals to represent the counterfactual for treated 
individuals and represent the effect of treatment for those participating in the LIS. Average treatment effect 
estimates weight treated and untreated individuals by their inverse probability of treatment and represent the effect 





Figure 3. Heterogenous ATE Effects by Cancer Site 
 
*Statistically significant at p= **0.05, ***0.001 
LIS=low-income subsidy. Estimates are the adjusted predicted risk of medication delay or omission for LIS vs. No 







Table 3. Secondary and Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Newly Diagnosed 
(1) Complete Case (2) Logit MI (3) 
Lower 50% 
Poverty (4) 





















     
N 4621 5993 6869 3498 
 
*Statistically significant at p= **0.05, ***0.001 
LIS=low-income subsidy; MI=multiple imputation. Estimates are presented as predicted risk differences calculated 
from the differential effect of LIS vs. No LIS from gradient boosted machine propensity adjusted logistic regression 
models using method of recycled predictions and delta method standard errors. Treatment on the treated estimates 
weight untreated individuals to represent the counterfactual for treated individuals and represent the effect of 
treatment for those participating in the LIS. Average treatment effect estimates weight treated and untreated 
individuals by their inverse probability of treatment and represent the effect of treatment on the full sample. Newly 
diagnosed includes individuals diagnosed within 2 years of survey date. Lower 50% poverty includes individuals 
living in a census tract with greater than 11% of the population at or below the federal poverty line. Insurance pay is 
a secondary exposure indicating any insurance coverage to pay for all or part of prescription medications. 
 
Figure 4. Probability of Treatment Delay or Omissions for LIS and Non-LIS Participants 
at Differing Levels of Census Tract Poverty 
 
LIS=low-income subsidy; Estimates are presented as the predicted risk of medication delay or omission for LIS vs. 
No LIS from gradient boosted machine propensity adjusted logistic regression models using method of recycled 
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Figure 5. Sample Inclusion 
 










Supplement B: Machine Learning Methods Description  
ML algorithms are sensitive to ‘tuning’ parameters – parameters that set specific rules for 
classification, such as the number of interactions or observations in a group. For example, to 
avoid small sample or outlier influence, the analyst may specify the minimum number of 
observations in a final grouping (terminal node) before the algorithm will attempt to ‘split’ or 
divide further. One systematic tuning technique is cross-validation, which splits data into 
‘training’ and ‘testing’ portions (folds) and re-estimates the algorithm over a range of tuning 
parameters, storing a specific metric or goodness of fit measure (which is produced on the ‘out of 
bag’ or held-out portion of the sample). The procedure is repeated over each fold, and then re-
sampled in its entirety to produce average effects. For final model assessment, it is also common 
to withhold a portion of the data entirely. This helps to protect against over-fitting of the 
algorithm and provide valid accuracy fit statistics. We complete 5-fold cross validation on a 75% 
random sample of our data, withholding 25% for out-of-bag model assessment. Tuning 
parameters include: the minimum number of observations allowed in a terminal node, the 
‘complexity’ or learning improvement parameter (a minimum scaled improvement required for 
additional splits), the number of trees to be built (random forest and GBM only), and the number 
of randomly selected covariates used in each tree (random forest only). Table S1 reports tuning 








Table 4. Selected ML Tuning parameters and Fit Metrics 
 








Interactions Accuracy Kappa 
CART 0.001 35 NA NA NA 0.774 0.399 
CART 0.005 35 NA NA NA 0.802 0.447 
CART 0.01 35 NA NA NA 0.807 0.445 
CART 0.015 35 NA NA NA 0.807 0.443 
CART 0.02 35 NA NA NA 0.805 0.425 
CART 0.025 35 NA NA NA 0.801 0.389 
CART 0.03 35 NA NA NA 0.8 0.383 
CART 0.001 40 NA NA NA 0.775 0.401 
CART 0.005 40 NA NA NA 0.802 0.448 
CART 0.006 40 NA NA NA 0.805 0.455 
CART 0.007 40 NA NA NA 0.807 0.459 
CART 0.008 40 NA NA NA 0.807 0.46 
CART 0.009 40 NA NA NA 0.81 0.462 
CART 0.01 40 NA NA NA 0.811 0.46 
CART 0.015 40 NA NA NA 0.811 0.459 
CART 0.02 40 NA NA NA 0.805 0.418 
CART 0.025 40 NA NA NA 0.802 0.393 
CART 0.03 40 NA NA NA 0.801 0.384 
CART 0.001 45 NA NA NA 0.78 0.412 
CART 0.005 45 NA NA NA 0.8 0.443 
CART 0.01 45 NA NA NA 0.806 0.444 
CART 0.015 45 NA NA NA 0.806 0.439 
CART 0.02 45 NA NA NA 0.804 0.419 
CART 0.025 45 NA NA NA 0.801 0.392 
CART 0.03 45 NA NA NA 0.8 0.382 
RF NA NA 80 100 NA 0.822 0.485 
RF NA NA 100 100 NA 0.821 0.485 
RF NA NA 120 100 NA 0.82 0.485 
RF NA NA 140 100 NA 0.819 0.482 
RF NA NA 160 100 NA 0.818 0.482 
RF NA NA 80 250 NA 0.823 0.489 
RF NA NA 100 250 NA 0.822 0.489 
RF NA NA 120 250 NA 0.823 0.493 
RF NA NA 140 250 NA 0.823 0.491 
RF NA NA 160 250 NA 0.82 0.487 
RF NA NA 80 500 NA 0.825 0.494 
RF NA NA 85 500 NA 0.825 0.495 
RF NA NA 90 500 NA 0.824 0.494 
RF NA NA 95 500 NA 0.823 0.49 
RF NA NA 100 500 NA 0.824 0.494 
RF NA NA 120 500 NA 0.822 0.49 
RF NA NA 140 500 NA 0.823 0.494 
RF NA NA 160 500 NA 0.822 0.492 
GBM 0.005 30 NA 8000 5 0.833 0.539 
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GBM 0.005 35 NA 8000 5 0.832 0.538 
GBM 0.005 40 NA 8000 5 0.833 0.541 
GBM 0.01 30 NA 8000 5 0.831 0.534 
GBM 0.01 35 NA 8000 5 0.83 0.533 
GBM 0.01 40 NA 8000 5 0.831 0.535 
GBM 0.05 30 NA 8000 5 0.828 0.525 
GBM 0.05 35 NA 8000 5 0.826 0.522 
GBM 0.05 40 NA 8000 5 0.827 0.524 
GBM 0.1 30 NA 8000 5 0.828 0.525 
GBM 0.1 35 NA 8000 5 0.826 0.521 
GBM 0.1 40 NA 8000 5 0.824 0.514 
GBM 0.5 30 NA 8000 5 0.821 0.514 
GBM 0.5 35 NA 8000 5 0.819 0.513 
GBM 0.5 40 NA 8000 5 0.818 0.505 
GBM 0.005 30 NA 8000 6 0.833 0.541 
GBM 0.005 35 NA 8000 6 0.833 0.539 
GBM 0.005 40 NA 8000 6 0.832 0.538 
GBM 0.01 30 NA 8000 6 0.831 0.533 
GBM 0.01 35 NA 8000 6 0.831 0.536 
GBM 0.01 40 NA 8000 6 0.831 0.536 
GBM 0.05 30 NA 8000 6 0.829 0.527 
GBM 0.05 35 NA 8000 6 0.827 0.522 
GBM 0.05 40 NA 8000 6 0.828 0.525 
GBM 0.1 30 NA 8000 6 0.826 0.519 
GBM 0.1 35 NA 8000 6 0.825 0.519 
GBM 0.1 40 NA 8000 6 0.827 0.523 
GBM 0.5 30 NA 8000 6 0.814 0.501 
GBM 0.5 35 NA 8000 6 0.814 0.498 
GBM 0.5 40 NA 8000 6 0.816 0.507 
*Final models are highlighted in yellow. 
**Depth=interaction depth; ntree=number of trees; mtry=number of sampled covariates used; sp=minimum number of 
observations in terminal node; cp=complexity parameter (minimum deviance for continued split);accuracy=percent of correct 
responses; roc=area under the receiver operating curve; avgdiff= average standardized difference across covariates 
 
Of the three algorithms, CART is the simplest to conceptualize, building just one ‘tree’. 











Figure 6. Example CART Tree 
 
This is the final tree created by the CART algorithm. Labels are not intended to be readable, rather the purpose is to 
show the general structure. Each final node represents a differential probability of selection into the LIS program    
 
 
The Random Forest algorithm builds many trees, each with a random subset of available 
predictors. After tuning, we set the number of predictors to 80, and build 500 trees. Across all of 
the trees Figure S2 shows the relative importance of the different predictors, by mean accuracy 
and Gini coefficient improvements. Marital status, education, and race were consistently the 

















Supplement C: Propensity Model Diagnostic Figures 
Figure 8. Predicted Probability of LIS Participation by Observed LIS 
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Supplement D: Primary Model Coefficients 
Table 5. Relative Measures (Odds Ratio) 
 ATE ATT 
 Odds Ratio 95% CI Odds Ratio 95% CI 
Delay or Omission 0.718*** [0.562,0.917] 0.548*** [0.432,0.694] 
Breast 1.573** [1.039,2.380] 1.638* [0.960,2.795] 
Colorectal 1.302 [0.881,1.926] 1.443 [0.848,2.456] 
Lung 1.31 [0.842,2.037] 1.391 [0.782,2.475] 
Prostate 1.333 [0.883,2.012] 1.564 [0.886,2.763] 
Age     
70-74 0.551*** [0.446,0.682] 0.506*** [0.387,0.662] 
75-79 0.390*** [0.305,0.500] 0.404*** [0.292,0.558] 
80-84 0.339*** [0.254,0.451] 0.369*** [0.257,0.530] 
85+ 0.226*** [0.154,0.330] 0.240*** [0.150,0.384] 
Male 1.308* [0.976,1.752] 1.343 [0.945,1.909] 
Race     
Black 1.153 [0.825,1.613] 0.882 [0.643,1.210] 
Other 1.587* [0.964,2.613] 1.079 [0.649,1.792] 
Hispanic 1.680** [1.115,2.532] 1.248 [0.855,1.822] 
Education     
HS grad 0.939 [0.732,1.205] 1.175 [0.900,1.534] 
Some college 0.984 [0.749,1.291] 1.079 [0.785,1.484] 
College+ 0.694** [0.514,0.938] 0.803 [0.544,1.187] 
Missing 0.985 [0.604,1.604] 0.779 [0.453,1.340] 
Marital Status     
Sep/Divorce 1.196 [0.900,1.589] 1.018 [0.749,1.383] 
Widowed 1.18 [0.914,1.523] 1.14 [0.842,1.544] 
Never Married 0.91 [0.649,1.275] 0.661** [0.465,0.938] 
Missing 1.406** [1.010,1.957] 1.38 [0.904,2.109] 
Urban Rural     
High Urban 0.956 [0.669,1.365] 1.029 [0.668,1.584] 
Low Urban 1.091 [0.811,1.468] 1.022 [0.713,1.463] 
Rural 0.941 [0.558,1.586] 0.973 [0.539,1.757] 
Smoking     
Some Days 1.432 [0.897,2.285] 1.466 [0.912,2.358] 
Not at all 1.032 [0.742,1.435] 1.129 [0.795,1.604] 
Missing 1.826* [0.927,3.596] 1.784 [0.811,3.925] 
Year of Survey 0.958*** [0.928,0.990] 0.976 [0.934,1.020] 
Proxy 1.103 [0.835,1.456] 1.148 [0.843,1.564] 
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Missing 1.015 [0.816,1.262] 1.21 [0.954,1.536] 
Region     
West 1.052 [0.774,1.429] 1.179 [0.787,1.769] 
Midwest 0.994 [0.703,1.405] 1.059 [0.672,1.670] 
South 1.206 [0.891,1.632] 1.386 [0.933,2.059] 
Cancer Stage     
Stage I 0.848 [0.644,1.116] 0.819 [0.576,1.165] 
Stage II 0.801 [0.592,1.083] 0.726* [0.503,1.049] 
Stage III 0.747 [0.514,1.087] 0.71 [0.452,1.116] 
Stage IV 0.701 [0.443,1.110] 0.778 [0.461,1.313] 
Missing 0.542* [0.273,1.073] 0.553 [0.259,1.182] 
Surgery 1.094** [1.014,1.179] 1.065 [0.971,1.168] 
Radiation 1.17 [0.970,1.410] 1.18 [0.940,1.481] 
Cancer Grade     
Grade 2 1.187 [0.894,1.575] 1.442* [0.992,2.097] 
Grade 3 1.133 [0.832,1.543] 1.514** [1.018,2.251] 
Grade 4 1.683** [1.005,2.820] 2.424** [1.231,4.773] 
Missing 1.315 [0.922,1.875] 1.551* [0.998,2.410] 
Comorbidity Count 1.096*** [1.072,1.122] 1.062*** [1.033,1.091] 
Census Tract SES     
MedianIncome 1 [1.000,1.000] 1 [1.000,1.000] 
PctBlacks 1.015*** [1.004,1.026] 1.016*** [1.004,1.029] 
Density 1.000** [1.000,1.000] 1 [1.000,1.000] 
PctWhites 1.015*** [1.006,1.024] 1.011** [1.001,1.022] 
PctHispanics 0.999 [0.991,1.007] 1.002 [0.993,1.010] 
PctHighSchoolOnly 0.987 [0.966,1.008] 0.974* [0.949,1.000] 












Table 6. Full Set of Coefficients, Final Outcome Models 
 
 Outcome model using Logit IPTW weights 
 ATE ATT 
Low Income Subsidy -0.364 [-1.441,0.713] -0.22 [-1.188,0.748] 
Breast 0.455* [-0.025,0.934] 0.760* [-0.082,1.603] 
Colorectal 0.382 [-0.090,0.854] 0.836* [-0.055,1.726] 
Lung 0.241 [-0.280,0.761] 0.326 [-0.600,1.253] 
Prostate 0.133 [-0.351,0.617] 0.661 [-0.263,1.586] 
LIS # Breast -0.013 [-1.161,1.136] -0.453 [-1.497,0.591] 
LIS # Colorectal -0.146 [-1.372,1.081] -0.717 [-1.837,0.402] 
LIS # Lung 0.234 [-1.068,1.536] -0.032 [-1.186,1.122] 
LIS # Prostate 0.534 [-0.660,1.729] -0.318 [-1.389,0.753] 
Age (Ref=<69)     
70-74 -0.578*** [-0.830,-0.327] -0.780*** [-1.113,-0.447] 
75-79 -0.884*** [-1.168,-0.599] -0.905*** [-1.298,-0.513] 
80-84 -0.965*** [-1.323,-0.606] -1.033*** [-1.455,-0.612] 
85+ -1.286*** [-1.715,-0.856] -1.156*** [-1.727,-0.585] 
Male 0.263 [-0.087,0.612] 0.192 [-0.230,0.614] 
Race (Ref=White)     
Black -0.114 [-0.503,0.275] -0.303 [-0.681,0.074] 
Other 0.514* [-0.090,1.117] 0.182 [-0.448,0.813] 
Hispanic 0.694*** [0.189,1.199] 0.412* [-0.060,0.884] 
Education (Ref=<HS)     
HS grad 0.007 [-0.299,0.313] 0.227 [-0.103,0.556] 
Some college 0.058 [-0.284,0.401] 0.071 [-0.310,0.451] 
College+ -0.243 [-0.609,0.123] -0.176 [-0.625,0.273] 
Missing 0.1 [-0.439,0.638] 0.025 [-0.529,0.578] 
Marital (Ref=Married)     
Sep/Divorce 0.366** [0.027,0.706] 0.172 [-0.202,0.545] 
Widowed 0.174 [-0.125,0.473] 0.076 [-0.275,0.428] 
Never Married -0.172 [-0.587,0.242] -0.467** [-0.889,-0.044] 
Missing 0.355* [-0.025,0.736] 0.339 [-0.156,0.833] 
Urban/Rural (Ref=Metro)     
High Urban -0.268 [-0.669,0.133] -0.228 [-0.744,0.288] 
Low Urban 0.1 [-0.291,0.492] -0.021 [-0.474,0.431] 
Rural -0.626 [-1.405,0.153] -0.637 [-1.505,0.231] 
Smoking (Ref=Most Days)     
Some Days 0.151 [-0.417,0.719] 0.215 [-0.356,0.787] 
Not at all -0.25 [-0.651,0.151] -0.201 [-0.629,0.227] 
Missing 0.239 [-0.510,0.989] 0.118 [-0.774,1.009] 
Year of Survey -0.047** [-0.086,-0.008] -0.032 [-0.084,0.021] 
Proxy 0.276 [-0.085,0.638] 0.215 [-0.193,0.624] 
Missing 0.207 [-0.059,0.472] 0.253* [-0.030,0.537] 
West 0.02 [-0.345,0.385] 0.244 [-0.275,0.762] 
Midwest 0.189 [-0.241,0.619] 0.164 [-0.370,0.698] 
South 0.127 [-0.223,0.476] 0.298 [-0.185,0.781] 
Stage (Ref=Stage 0)     
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Stage I -0.152 [-0.475,0.170] -0.219 [-0.666,0.228] 
Stage II -0.275 [-0.636,0.087] -0.420* [-0.870,0.029] 
Stage III -0.257 [-0.698,0.184] -0.257 [-0.819,0.306] 
Stage IV -0.525* [-1.061,0.012] -0.468 [-1.087,0.150] 
Missing -0.646 [-1.450,0.159] -0.608 [-1.462,0.247] 
Surgery 0.074 [-0.016,0.164] 0.065 [-0.039,0.168] 
Radiation  0.18 [-0.057,0.417] 0.135 [-0.153,0.422] 
Grade (Ref=Grade 1)     
Grade 2 0.333* [-0.024,0.690] 0.598** [0.106,1.090] 
Grade 3 0.372* [-0.013,0.758] 0.785*** [0.273,1.296] 
Grade 4 0.437 [-0.135,1.008] 0.919** [0.141,1.697] 
Missing 0.499** [0.065,0.932] 0.778*** [0.213,1.343] 
Census Tract Med Income 0 [-0.000,0.000] 0 [-0.000,0.000] 
Census Tract Pct Blacks 0.014** [0.001,0.026] 0.017** [0.003,0.030] 
Census Tract Density 0.000** [0.000,0.000] 0.000** [0.000,0.000] 
Census Tract Pct Whites 0.016*** [0.006,0.026] 0.015** [0.003,0.026] 
Census Tract Pct Hispanics -0.001 [-0.011,0.008] 0.001 [-0.010,0.011] 
Census Tract Pct HS Only -0.014 [-0.040,0.012] -0.017 [-0.050,0.017] 
Census Tract Pct College  -0.013 [-0.031,0.005] -0.007 [-0.030,0.016] 
Pct living below poverty 0.015 [-0.005,0.034] 0.014 [-0.010,0.037] 
_cons 91.487** [12.980,169.993] 60.479 [-44.676,165.633] 
N 6869  6869  
 
 Outcome model using CART IPTW weights 
  ATE ATT 
Low Income Subsidy -0.142 [-1.035,0.752] -0.703 [-1.671,0.266] 
Breast 0.356 [-0.212,0.924] 0.153 [-0.746,1.052] 
Colorectal 0.287 [-0.234,0.808] 0.449 [-0.462,1.359] 
Lung -0.024 [-0.632,0.584] -0.429 [-1.505,0.647] 
Prostate -0.204 [-0.735,0.328] 0.094 [-0.793,0.981] 
LIS # Breast -0.15 [-1.159,0.859] 0.197 [-0.852,1.245] 
LIS # Colorectal -0.304 [-1.438,0.830] -0.443 [-1.590,0.703] 
LIS # Lung 0.07 [-1.091,1.232] 0.614 [-0.627,1.855] 
LIS # Prostate 0.219 [-0.802,1.239] 0.198 [-0.858,1.254] 
Age (Ref=<69)     
70-74 -0.492*** [-0.789,-0.196] -0.581*** [-0.959,-0.203] 
75-79 -0.756*** [-1.084,-0.429] -0.800*** [-1.226,-0.374] 
80-84 -0.927*** [-1.298,-0.556] -0.965*** [-1.462,-0.469] 
85+ -1.405*** [-1.959,-0.852] -1.865*** [-2.457,-1.272] 
Male 0.424* [-0.002,0.850] 0.249 [-0.259,0.757] 
Race (Ref=White)     
Black 0.095 [-0.363,0.552] -0.226 [-0.666,0.214] 
Other 0.305 [-0.331,0.941] 0.141 [-0.530,0.813] 
Hispanic 0.361 [-0.123,0.845] 0.051 [-0.425,0.526] 
Education (Ref=<HS)     
HS grad -0.034 [-0.341,0.273] 0.328* [-0.019,0.674] 
Some college 0.009 [-0.348,0.365] -0.025 [-0.464,0.414] 
College+ -0.254 [-0.679,0.171] -0.460* [-1.005,0.085] 
Missing -0.014 [-0.656,0.627] -0.13 [-0.928,0.669] 
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Marital (Ref=Married)     
Sep/Divorce 0.004 [-0.386,0.393] -0.211 [-0.651,0.230] 
Widowed 0.012 [-0.333,0.356] -0.16 [-0.574,0.254] 
Never Married -0.3 [-0.729,0.130] -0.544** [-1.000,-0.088] 
Missing 0.531** [0.057,1.005] 0.407 [-0.151,0.966] 
Urban/Rural (Ref=Metro)     
High Urban -0.079 [-0.529,0.370] 0.248 [-0.336,0.833] 
Low Urban 0.259 [-0.165,0.684] 0.299 [-0.197,0.794] 
Rural 0.207 [-0.484,0.898] 0.523 [-0.285,1.331] 
Smoking (Ref=Most Days)     
Some Days -0.359 [-0.978,0.261] 0.026 [-0.601,0.654] 
Not at all -0.271 [-0.741,0.199] -0.1 [-0.587,0.388] 
Missing 0.295 [-0.654,1.245] 0.641 [-0.329,1.611] 
Year of Survey -0.060*** [-0.104,-0.016] -0.048 [-0.107,0.010] 
Proxy 0.349* [-0.003,0.701] 0.436** [0.013,0.860] 
Missing 0.309** [0.014,0.603] 0.317** [0.007,0.627] 
West -0.171 [-0.602,0.261] 0.241 [-0.329,0.810] 
Midwest -0.037 [-0.521,0.447] 0.383 [-0.266,1.032] 
South -0.091 [-0.506,0.325] 0.34 [-0.223,0.904] 
Stage (Ref=Stage 0)     
Stage I 0.033 [-0.316,0.383] -0.026 [-0.511,0.460] 
Stage II 0.051 [-0.343,0.445] -0.129 [-0.642,0.383] 
Stage III -0.021 [-0.506,0.464] 0.055 [-0.596,0.705] 
Stage IV 0.169 [-0.457,0.794] 0.167 [-0.561,0.895] 
Missing -0.774* [-1.632,0.084] -0.704 [-1.699,0.292] 
Surgery 0.075 [-0.018,0.169] 0.061 [-0.052,0.175] 
Radiation  0.093 [-0.160,0.346] 0.049 [-0.264,0.361] 
Grade (Ref=Grade 1)     
Grade 2 0.084 [-0.310,0.478] 0.212 [-0.286,0.710] 
Grade 3 0.138 [-0.293,0.569] 0.199 [-0.325,0.723] 
Grade 4 0.18 [-0.475,0.835] 0.701 [-0.173,1.574] 
Missing 0.388 [-0.078,0.853] 0.663** [0.066,1.260] 
Census Tract Med Income 0 [-0.000,0.000] 0 [-0.000,0.000] 
Census Tract Pct Blacks 0.011 [-0.003,0.025] 0.022*** [0.007,0.036] 
Census Tract Density 0 [-0.000,0.000] 0 [-0.000,0.000] 
Census Tract Pct Whites 0.009 [-0.003,0.021] 0.013** [0.001,0.026] 
Census Tract Pct Hispanics -0.002 [-0.012,0.008] 0.004 [-0.008,0.016] 
Census Tract Pct HS Only -0.017 [-0.047,0.013] -0.022 [-0.059,0.014] 
Census Tract Pct College  -0.005 [-0.023,0.013] 0.003 [-0.020,0.026] 
Pct living below poverty 0.005 [-0.012,0.023] 0.001 [-0.021,0.022] 
_cons 118.813*** [29.799,207.827] 94.351 [-23.843,212.546] 
N 6869  6869  
 
 Outcome Model using Random Forest IPTW weights 
  ATE ATT 
Low Income Subsidy -0.452 [-1.277,0.372] -0.305 [-1.118,0.508] 
Breast 0.244 [-0.173,0.662] 0.452 [-0.216,1.121] 
Colorectal 0.233 [-0.172,0.638] 0.569 [-0.122,1.261] 
Lung 0.26 [-0.196,0.715] 0.443 [-0.335,1.221] 
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Prostate -0.041 [-0.457,0.374] 0.388 [-0.295,1.071] 
LIS # Breast 0.042 [-0.863,0.946] -0.257 [-1.134,0.621] 
LIS # Colorectal -0.427 [-1.382,0.527] -0.52 [-1.470,0.431] 
LIS # Lung 0.144 [-0.835,1.124] -0.178 [-1.182,0.826] 
LIS # Prostate 0.646 [-0.324,1.616] -0.107 [-0.994,0.781] 
Age (Ref=<69)     
70-74 -0.354*** [-0.581,-0.127] -0.582*** [-0.857,-0.307] 
75-79 -0.739*** [-0.970,-0.509] -0.762*** [-1.079,-0.445] 
80-84 -0.837*** [-1.102,-0.571] -0.788*** [-1.150,-0.427] 
85+ -1.291*** [-1.659,-0.924] -1.303*** [-1.795,-0.810] 
Male 0.127 [-0.161,0.415] 0.153 [-0.210,0.517] 
Race (Ref=White)     
Black 0.209 [-0.123,0.542] -0.094 [-0.411,0.223] 
Other 0.351 [-0.122,0.824] -0.16 [-0.690,0.370] 
Hispanic 0.443** [0.052,0.835] 0.073 [-0.297,0.443] 
Education (Ref=<HS)     
HS grad -0.135 [-0.376,0.105] 0.154 [-0.113,0.420] 
Some college -0.108 [-0.372,0.155] 0.11 [-0.219,0.439] 
College+ -0.352** [-0.680,-0.024] -0.11 [-0.525,0.305] 
Missing -0.104 [-0.574,0.365] -0.307 [-0.893,0.279] 
Marital (Ref=Married)     
Sep/Divorce 0.242* [-0.046,0.530] -0.06 [-0.376,0.255] 
Widowed 0.122 [-0.128,0.372] 0.031 [-0.279,0.340] 
Never Married -0.11 [-0.441,0.221] -0.543*** [-0.883,-0.203] 
Missing 0.265 [-0.055,0.585] 0.247 [-0.186,0.681] 
Urban/Rural (Ref=Metro)     
High Urban -0.069 [-0.415,0.277] 0.103 [-0.327,0.534] 
Low Urban -0.003 [-0.284,0.277] -0.104 [-0.459,0.250] 
Rural -0.053 [-0.566,0.460] 0.08 [-0.486,0.647] 
Smoking (Ref=Most Days)     
Some Days 0.283 [-0.175,0.741] 0.323 [-0.154,0.800] 
Not at all 0.035 [-0.279,0.350] 0.154 [-0.200,0.508] 
Missing 0.792** [0.136,1.448] 0.67 [-0.132,1.471] 
Year of Survey -0.033** [-0.065,-0.001] -0.011 [-0.057,0.034] 
Proxy 0.264** [0.007,0.521] 0.199 [-0.106,0.504] 
Missing 0.049 [-0.177,0.274] 0.265** [0.019,0.511] 
West -0.051 [-0.359,0.257] 0.149 [-0.273,0.571] 
Midwest -0.035 [-0.384,0.315] 0.143 [-0.335,0.621] 
South 0.141 [-0.161,0.444] 0.372* [-0.039,0.784] 
Stage (Ref=Stage 0)     
Stage I -0.135 [-0.406,0.135] -0.194 [-0.561,0.172] 
Stage II -0.091 [-0.394,0.211] -0.29 [-0.672,0.092] 
Stage III -0.184 [-0.542,0.173] -0.276 [-0.741,0.189] 
Stage IV -0.222 [-0.660,0.217] -0.193 [-0.729,0.343] 
Missing -0.552 [-1.232,0.128] -0.663 [-1.452,0.127] 
Surgery 0.062 [-0.019,0.142] 0.047 [-0.050,0.144] 
Radiation  0.151 [-0.041,0.343] 0.181 [-0.048,0.411] 
Grade (Ref=Grade 1)     
Grade 2 0.151 [-0.137,0.439] 0.396** [0.000,0.791] 
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Grade 3 0.157 [-0.159,0.474] 0.468** [0.050,0.887] 
Grade 4 0.382 [-0.116,0.879] 0.715** [0.025,1.404] 
Missing 0.329* [-0.020,0.679] 0.528** [0.070,0.986] 
Census Tract Med Income 0 [-0.000,0.000] 0 [-0.000,0.000] 
Census Tract Pct Blacks 0.012** [0.002,0.022] 0.011* [-0.001,0.023] 
Census Tract Density 0.000** [0.000,0.000] 0 [-0.000,0.000] 
Census Tract Pct Whites 0.013*** [0.005,0.021] 0.006 [-0.004,0.017] 
Census Tract Pct Hispanics -0.002 [-0.010,0.006] 0 [-0.008,0.009] 
Census Tract Pct HS Only -0.020* [-0.040,0.000] -0.030** [-0.056,-0.005] 
Census Tract Pct College  -0.013* [-0.026,0.001] -0.007 [-0.024,0.011] 
Pct living below poverty 0.005 [-0.009,0.019] -0.008 [-0.025,0.009] 
_cons 63.462* [-1.029,127.954] 21.246 [-70.744,113.236] 
N 6869  6701  
 
 Outcome Model using GBM IPTW weights 
  ATE ATT 
Low Income Subsidy -0.462 [-1.309,0.384] -0.255 [-1.106,0.596] 
Breast 0.343 [-0.099,0.785] 0.604* [-0.112,1.320] 
Colorectal 0.315 [-0.110,0.740] 0.784** [0.045,1.524] 
Lung 0.27 [-0.215,0.756] 0.469 [-0.365,1.302] 
Prostate 0.054 [-0.380,0.489] 0.567 [-0.182,1.315] 
LIS # Breast -0.049 [-0.964,0.867] -0.335 [-1.260,0.590] 
LIS # Colorectal -0.205 [-1.202,0.791] -0.701 [-1.693,0.292] 
LIS # Lung 0.226 [-0.808,1.260] -0.178 [-1.229,0.873] 
LIS # Prostate 0.594 [-0.364,1.552] -0.262 [-1.200,0.676] 
Age (Ref=<69)     
70-74 -0.479*** [-0.700,-0.258] -0.639*** [-0.924,-0.354] 
75-79 -0.799*** [-1.052,-0.546] -0.853*** [-1.198,-0.508] 
80-84 -0.919*** [-1.213,-0.625] -0.957*** [-1.334,-0.579] 
85+ -1.275*** [-1.659,-0.891] -1.289*** [-1.796,-0.782] 
Male 0.212 [-0.095,0.520] 0.219 [-0.159,0.597] 
Race (Ref=White)     
Black 0.125 [-0.225,0.475] -0.164 [-0.499,0.170] 
Other 0.431 [-0.092,0.953] 0.003 [-0.531,0.537] 
Hispanic 0.573** [0.127,1.020] 0.252 [-0.164,0.668] 
Education (Ref=<HS)     
HS grad -0.079 [-0.344,0.186] 0.207 [-0.075,0.488] 
Some college -0.031 [-0.315,0.254] 0.056 [-0.274,0.386] 
College+ -0.412*** [-0.725,-0.099] -0.243 [-0.657,0.170] 
Missing -0.073 [-0.565,0.418] -0.268 [-0.836,0.300] 
Marital (Ref=Married)     
Sep/Divorce 0.246 [-0.057,0.549] -0.011 [-0.344,0.323] 
Widowed 0.141 [-0.123,0.405] 0.084 [-0.238,0.406] 
Never Married -0.017 [-0.386,0.353] -0.407** [-0.790,-0.025] 
Missing 0.293* [-0.037,0.623] 0.218 [-0.222,0.659] 
Urban/Rural (Ref=Metro)     
High Urban -0.122 [-0.495,0.251] -0.063 [-0.514,0.389] 
Low Urban 0.011 [-0.307,0.330] -0.064 [-0.456,0.327] 
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Rural -0.239 [-0.801,0.324] -0.186 [-0.831,0.458] 
Smoking (Ref=Most Days)     
Some Days 0.312 [-0.190,0.814] 0.341 [-0.159,0.841] 
Not at all -0.1 [-0.449,0.248] -0.025 [-0.397,0.347] 
Missing 0.552 [-0.140,1.244] 0.526 [-0.276,1.329] 
Year of Survey -0.038** [-0.071,-0.005] -0.022 [-0.069,0.025] 
Proxy 0.260* [-0.037,0.556] 0.208 [-0.133,0.549] 
Missing 0.101 [-0.129,0.330] 0.220* [-0.033,0.473] 
West -0.036 [-0.355,0.284] 0.229 [-0.215,0.673] 
Midwest -0.018 [-0.384,0.347] 0.113 [-0.383,0.610] 
South 0.125 [-0.188,0.437] 0.378* [-0.053,0.809] 
Stage (Ref=Stage 0)     
Stage I -0.106 [-0.388,0.176] -0.146 [-0.520,0.228] 
Stage II -0.146 [-0.460,0.167] -0.277 [-0.666,0.112] 
Stage III -0.138 [-0.526,0.249] -0.226 [-0.714,0.261] 
Stage IV -0.222 [-0.706,0.261] -0.233 [-0.790,0.324] 
Missing -0.545 [-1.237,0.147] -0.537 [-1.329,0.254] 
Surgery 0.075* [-0.006,0.156] 0.065 [-0.033,0.162] 
Radiation  0.174* [-0.026,0.374] 0.207 [-0.042,0.456] 
Grade (Ref=Grade 1)     
Grade 2 0.156 [-0.142,0.455] 0.349* [-0.059,0.757] 
Grade 3 0.124 [-0.199,0.446] 0.402* [-0.021,0.825] 
Grade 4 0.371 [-0.154,0.896] 0.725** [0.027,1.423] 
Missing 0.281 [-0.084,0.645] 0.474** [0.005,0.942] 
Census Tract Med Income 0 [-0.000,0.000] 0 [-0.000,0.000] 
Census Tract Pct Blacks 0.012** [0.000,0.023] 0.012* [-0.001,0.025] 
Census Tract Density 0.000** [0.000,0.000] 0 [-0.000,0.000] 
Census Tract Pct Whites 0.013*** [0.004,0.022] 0.008 [-0.003,0.019] 
Census Tract Pct Hispanics -0.003 [-0.012,0.005] -0.001 [-0.011,0.008] 
Census Tract Pct HS Only -0.016 [-0.039,0.007] -0.024* [-0.053,0.004] 
Census Tract Pct College  -0.012 [-0.028,0.003] -0.006 [-0.026,0.014] 
Pct living below poverty 0.009 [-0.006,0.025] 0.002 [-0.017,0.022] 
_cons 74.293** [6.966,141.620] 41.451 [-53.368,136.270] 








CHAPTER 3: CANCER MORTALITY AND FINANCIALLY-MOTIVIATED DELAY 




Background: A growing literature in cancer has demonstrated important differences in 
behavior and outcomes for patients who experience high financial burden as a result of their care. 
Delaying or choosing to forgo medication because of cost is one potential pathway to worse 
outcomes. There is limited evidence of how these cost-related drivers affect long-term cancer 
outcomes.  
Objective: To estimate the effect of financially-motivated delay or omission of 
prescription medication on all-cause and cancer-specific mortality among newly diagnosed 
cancer patients.  
Methods: Bladder, breast, colorectal, lung, and prostate cancer patients diagnosed 
between 2007 and 2015 were included from an observational cohort linking national registry, 
survey and claims data. We assessed differential time to death by self-reported financially-
motivated delay or omission of prescription medication among those diagnosed prior to and 
within three years of reporting on delay or omission. Machine learning (ML) algorithms 
(gradient boosted machines) predicted and balanced (using inverse-probability of treatment 
weights) underlying differences between the population reporting delay/omission and those not 
reporting delay/omission using a rich set of clinical and demographic controls. Weighted, 
propensity adjusted Cox proportional hazards models report the ratio of hazards for all-cause and 
 
 52 
cancer-specific mortality for delay or omission vs. no delay or omission. Additional analyses 
stratify results by cancer site and limit to those diagnosed within one year of survey response. 
Results: The sample included 5,106 individuals, 11% of whom reported delaying or 
omitting prescription medication due to cost in the past six months. Between 2007 and 2017 the 
sample experienced 1,874 all-cause and 608 cancer-specific deaths. ML algorithms reduced 
standardized mean differences between groups to less than 4% on average. In weighted models, 
medication delay/omission due to cost was associated with an increase in all-cause mortality of 
HR: 1.26, 95%CI: [1.04,1.52], and in cancer-specific mortality of 1.54 [1.15, 2.07]. Effects were 
heterogeneous by cancer site and strongest in lung and bladder cancers.  
Conclusions: Delay or omission of medication due specifically to patient cost burden 
may result in large and significant increases to all-cause and cancer-specific mortality. 
 
Introduction 
The cost of medical care for patients with cancer is considerably higher than the average 
non-cancer patient, both to the healthcare system and the individual patient.16,76 In cancer, there 
has been recent concern about the cost burden to patients associated with ongoing medical 
treatment and its unintended effects.8,40 How much an individual pays for medical care depends 
on a variety of factors, making it difficult to isolate cost-to-outcome associations from those 
driven primarily by disease severity, insurance status, sociodemographics, or regional variation. 
Still, a growing literature in cancer has shown that financial burden may lead to lower 
treatment adherence or discontinuation, lower quality of life (especially in psychological 
domains) or functional status, and other financial tradeoffs.6,9,69 Fewer studies have been able to 
tie individual cost burden to long-term outcomes. In perhaps the strongest evidence of the 
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relationship between cost burden and long-term outcomes in cancer to date, Ramsey and 
colleagues demonstrate increased risk of bankruptcy due to cancer-related cost burden that led to 
increases in mortality.35 This evidence explores just one potential pathway from cost burden to 
mortality, via financial insolvency and its consequences, however, and many others remain 
unexplored. 
One such pathway – a patient’s decision to delay or omit treatment – may also have 
important effects on cancer health outcomes, and specifically mortality. Delays across the cancer 
continuum, from screening to diagnosis to treatment have long been the focus of cancer 
population research, but researchers are often unable to identify specific causes for delay.71,77–79 
In general, the literature lacks direct empirical evidence focusing on treatment disruption due 
specifically to cost, a potentially important driver to isolate when setting policy. 
In this this study we seek to close that gap by estimating the impact of delay or omission 
of prescription medication due to cost on all-cause and cancer-specific mortality in cancer 
patients. We used a non-experimental retrospective cohort design balancing groups with novel 
advanced machine learning (ML) prediction methods to estimate the difference in the adjusted 
hazard of death due to cost-related medication delay/omission. This work adds to the growing 
literature on the impact of cost burden on cancer and, specifically, to a very limited set of studies 
focused on mortality. 
 
Methods  
Without the ability to randomize treatment delay or omission, we turned to an 
observational cohort of individuals previously diagnosed with cancer. Because we expected 
selection into the group of those who delay or omit medication, the multi-stage study design used 
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machine learning (ML) prediction methods drawing on a rich set of clinical and 
sociodemographic characteristics to balance groups prior to inference. 
Data for this study come from a three-way linkage of the Surveillance, Epidemiology, 
and End Results Program (SEER) Cancer registry53, fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare claims, and 
the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey.54 This linked 
resource contains detailed information on cancer-related clinical measures at initial diagnosis, a 
history of medical services used, and self-reported socio-demographic characteristics. Survey 
weights for the SEER-CAHPS sample allow for generalization to the Medicare population. 
All individuals in the sample had an initial primary diagnosis including solid tumors of 
the breast, lung, prostate, colorectal, or bladder between 2007 and 2015. To limit survivor bias in 
the sample, only individuals who completed a CAHPS survey after and within three years of 
primary cancer diagnosis (cancer date + 3 years <= survey date) were included for analysis. We 
also excluded persons with missing or pre-survey dates of death and missing delay/omission 
response (Figure 10). 
 
Exposure 
To assess delay or omission of prescription medication we used a cross-sectional self-
reported measure from the CAHPS survey: “In the last 6 months, did you ever delay or not fill a 
prescription because you felt that you could not afford it?” The wording of this survey intends to 
separate delay or omission for prescription medication related exclusively to cost from delay 





As outcomes, we considered all-cause and cancer-specific mortality ascribed from the 
Medicare claims files and the SEER registry. Both outcomes are measured as the time from 
survey date (and therefore within 6 months of reported delay/omission) to event or censoring due 
to study end or competing event. All-cause mortality includes person time for all available years 
of the study period (through March 15th, 2017). Cancer-specific mortality censored individuals 
from non-cancer causes at the time of death.  
 
Covariates 
As part of the three-way linkage between registry, survey, and claims data, we used a 
large set of covariates for prediction models. From SEER, we included information on site, 
grade, stage, diagnosis date, initial treatment, and SEER region. From CAHPS, we included 
socio-demographic information such as age, race, ethnicity, gender, marital status, education, 
smoking status, and prescription drug coverage (part D) status. Medicare claims provided a 
history clinical diagnosis codes, organized into 285 clinical categories by the AHRQ Clinical 
Classification System (CCS).55 Finally, using census tract identifiers, we merged area-level 
information about poverty, income, and demographic composition from the American 
Community Survey (ACS). 
 
Analytic Strategy 
To estimate the impact of cost-related delay or omission of prescription medication on 
mortality in the presence of selection, we employed a propensity weighting analysis, aided by 
ML prediction models used to predict exposure (delay or omission). Under the potential 
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outcomes framework, inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW) can be used to balance 
exposed and unexposed groups on observed covariates.57 
In the first stage of this estimation procedure, we predicted medication delay or omission 
due to cost as a function of the available covariates described above (including Medicare sample 
survey weights). Predictions were generated using a recursive regression tree-based ML 
algorithm that has become popular in healthcare research for its flexibility and often superior fit, 
Gradient Boosted Machines (GBM).60,61 For comparison purposes, we also fit a logistic 
regression model with a limited set of covariates. In general, learning algorithms excel at sifting 
through many predictors and identifying complex relationships in the data, compared to 
traditional prediction models.59–62 To guard against over-fitting, we fit models using 5-fold cross-
validation on a training portion of the full sample (75%) and measured fit/accuracy statistics 
against a held-out testing portion (25%). Final tuning parameters for the GBM models were 
selected on the basis fit statistics, including the receiver operating curve (AUC), and percent 
accuracy, and refined to minimize mean standardized difference.80 Additional details regarding 
tuning and fit for ML models is available in the supplemental materials.  
Final GBM models include 196 predictors, and 7,249 regression trees with a minimum 
terminal node size (predictions based on groups of no less than) of 25. Predictions produced an 
out-of-bag (testing sample) accuracy of 89%, an AUC of 77% and an average mean standardized 
difference across all covariates of 3.2%. Additional details regarding tuning of the GBM 
algorithms is available in the supplemental materials. 
We next generated a propensity score for each individual in our sample, calculated as the 
inverse of the predicted probability of experiencing the observed exposure (delay or omission). 
This average treatment effect (ATE) estimator provides an average effect of delay/omission 
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across the full sample by weighting both exposed and unexposed groups. To reduce probability 
outliers we used a stabilized version of the ATE.65,81 We compare weighted and unweighted 
mean standardized differences for all covariates to assess the balance before and after 
adjustment.80 
Final outcome models are weighted Cox proportional hazard models describing the time 
to event (all-cause, cancer-specific death), where the weights are IPTW ATE weights. Final cox 
models include a binary indicator delay/omission of prescribed medication due to cost, as well as 
a set of clinical and demographic controls (those used in prediction minus individual CCS codes) 
to guard against propensity mis-specification. Results are interpreted as the ratio of the hazard 
between the two groups, holding constant observed covariates. 
 
Planned Sensitivity Analyses 
As exploratory analyses, we also considered heterogenous main effects stratified by 
cancer site (prediction and outcome models re-estimated). If delay or omission of prescription 
medication affects different cancer populations differently, we could expect differences in the 
relative hazard in stratified models. We also tested effects separately in a cohort of “newly 
diagnosed” patients – those who were diagnosed within 12 months of their reported response 
regarding medication delay/omission. The newly diagnosed are most likely to be currently 
undergoing cancer treatment and may be at differential risk if delays to cancer medication are 
associated with mortality differently than other types of medication. Finally, we consider 
complete case analysis (88% of full sample) as an alternative to our primary missing data 




The study was approved by the University of North Carolina Institutional Review Board. 
All analyses were conducted using R (v3.5.1) and Stata 15 (StataCorp® College Station, TX). 
 
Results 
The final sample included 5,106 individuals diagnosed with solid tumors between 2007 
and 2015. Approximately 11% of the sample reported delaying or omitting prescription 
medication due to cost in the past six months. Prior to weighting, those who reported 
delay/omission had significantly different demographic and clinical characteristics, including on 
age (16% MSD), race (17% MSD), education (21% MSD), area level poverty (20% MSD), and 
others (Table 7). Between 2007 and 2017 the sample experienced 1,874 all-cause and 608 
cancer-specific deaths.  
Stabilized propensity weights generated from first-stage predictions were smooth 
continuous functions demonstrating sufficient overlap required for propensity score-based 
inference (Supplement B). Balance between individuals reporting delay or omission and those 
not reporting was significantly improved from more than 20% on some unweighted covariates to 
below 5% on average, and below 15% on all individual predictors after weighting (Table 7).  
Weighted Cox proportional hazards models estimated the relative hazard of mortality 
associated with delay/omission of prescription medication (Table 8). In the full sample, delay or 
omission due to cost was associated with an increase in all-cause mortality (HR: 1.26, 95%CI: 
[1.04,1.52]). GBM models also demonstrated an increase in cancer-specific mortality (1.54 
[1.15, 2.07]) associated with delay or omission. At 10 years, this represents an average difference 
of approximately 8 percentage points (56%-48%) in predicted all-cause survival and 3 
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percentage points (93%-90%) in predicted cancer survival (Figure 11). Traditional logit 
prediction models produced slightly stronger, but similar estimates.  
Models stratified by primary cancer diagnosis revealed observed heterogeneity, with 
strong and significant associations between delay and all-cause mortality in lung (1.70 
[1.24,2.32]), breast (1.51 [1.01,2.27]), and bladder (2.07 [1.10,3.90]) cancers and smaller, 
insignificant effects in prostate (1.01 [0.68, 1.50]) and colorectal (1.35 [0.78, 2.33]) (Figure 12, 
Table 9). Delay/omission was associated with increased risk of cancer-specific mortality in all 
cancer sites as well, though similar to the pooled estimate, estimates were considerably less 
precise, likely due to fewer events.     
For the sample of individuals most likely to be engaged in cancer treatment (newly 
diagnosed <=1 year; N=1,702) we observed similar but mildly stronger associations, compared 
to the full sample; medication delay/omission was associated with an increased hazard of death 
from any cause of 1.31 [0.98,1.77] and an increased hazard of death from cancer of 1.59 [1.03, 
2.44]. We did not observe any qualitative difference to our findings when limited the sample to 
complete cases only.  
 
Discussion 
For newly diagnosed cancer patients, delay or omission of prescription medication due 
specifically to cost may increase the hazard of all-cause death by as much as 26%, and cancer-
specific death as much as 54%.  
Overall, these estimates are directionally consistent but smaller than estimates from 
Ramsey and colleagues who compared cancer patients filing for bankruptcy to those who do not 
(all-cause: HR 1.79, cancer-specific: not reported).35 Bankruptcy is a severe form of financial 
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hardship that may have a more substantial effect on mortality. One additional study used data 
from the 1996 Health and Retirement Study cohort and found increased risk of mortality (all-
cause: HR 1.42, cancer-specific: not reported) for individuals reporting financial burden more 
generally.33 Another potential explanation for somewhat smaller all-cause mortality estimates in 
this study than those reported in prior work is the ability of the ML algorithms, coupled with rich 
data, to remove additional residual confounding relationships not captured under more traditional 
approaches. Indeed, we see somewhat inflated estimates in our own logit comparison models 
(all-cause mortality) that failed to include interactions or higher-order terms that may be 
important to the prediction/balance.  
Cancer-specific mortality estimates, while less precise (fewer events), demonstrated an 
increased risk for those who delay medication due to cost of up to 52%. We are unaware of any 
currently available estimates relating cost burden to cancer-specific mortality. Though the 
precision of the estimates warrants caution, these findings suggest that cost-related medication 
delay/omission may be even more impactful on cancer mortality than overall.  
We also find evidence of substantial heterogeneity by cancer site. Each of the cancer sites 
included in this study have noticeably different recommended treatment options, prognoses, and 
underlying patient populations. For example, 10-year survival is high in prostate cancer with a 
relatively low total cost of care and limited pharmacologic treatment options for the majority of 
patients, perhaps contributing a lesser detriment associated with delaying or omitting prescription 
medication.82 In contrast, lung and colorectal cancers each have much poorer prognosis, include 
expensive targeted therapy among the available treatment options, and demonstrate large 
associations with cancer-specific mortality in our analyses. As is often the case in cancer, it 
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seems prudent to tailor or at least account for these differences in designing policy or 
interventional solutions. 
Though we are unable to observe the specific drugs patients reported delaying/omitting, 
we attempted subgroup analysis aimed at a population most expected to currently undergoing 
cancer treatment: those diagnosed within the last year. In this subgroup, we observed mildly 
increased all-cause and cancer-specific mortality differences, compared to the full sample. At a 
minimum, these results suggest that medication prescribed within the first year of cancer 
diagnosis may be particularly important to future health outcomes.  
To our knowledge this analysis is one of a very small number of studies relating a direct 
or indirect impact of cost burden to mortality in cancer patients, and the only to focus exclusively 
on the mechanism of delays/omission of medication, or to report cancer-specific mortality 
estimates. It is, however, part of a much larger literature on various health effects associated with 
financial hardship. Kaisaeng and colleagues find strong associations between out-of-pocket cost 
and treatment adherence/discontinuation.9 Other studies have found significant relationships 
between self-reported financial burden and self-reported quality of life, an equally important near 
and long-term outcome to patients.46,83 
We note a number of important limitations to this work. First, our estimates account only 
observable factors. While our data contain a larger number of potential predictors than are often 
available in claims-based secondary data analyses, concepts such as health literacy, trust in the 
healthcare system or care coordination are difficult to measure and could all affect a person’s 
medication decisions as well as mortality. Balancing groups using complex high-order prediction 
algorithms, such as GBM, helps to fit interactions or functional forms that are difficult to 
hypothesize, but still are limited by the data they use. Second, we are unable to differentiate 
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between delays in cancer treatment from delays to medication for other comorbid conditions. We 
attempted sensitivity analyses aimed at creating a cohort likely to be on active cancer treatment 
at the time of answering the question, but cannot be certain of the respondent’s intent. Notably, 
we find either delays to cancer treatment or to treatment for comorbid conditions of important 
policy interest, and urge future work to more precisely separate the two. Finally, the sample 
population includes only Medicare patients, and while other work has demonstrated the 
importance of financial burden across insurance types,23,69,84 our results may not generalize.  
Results from this study and others on the effects of financial burden on cancer health 
outcomes have important policy implications. Individualized or localized solutions are designed 
to be flexible enough to meet the needs of those they seek to serve, and often of those who need 
it most, including patient assistant or financial navigation programs,85 pharmaceutical assistance 
(excluding Medicare), and even larger policy programs, such as the 340B program.86 Yet many 
patients are excluded from these programs, and even insured patients continue to report being 
burdened by cost.37 Furthermore, a piecemeal-type system can create complex procedural 
barriers and differential access to care that often disadvantages minorities, those with low health 
literacy, or other vulnerable populations.31,32 Finally, it becomes nearly impossible to separate 
the parts that are working from those that are not, leading to inefficient interventional design 
based on weak evidence.  
There are actionable items that may improve future decision making both for patients and 
policy makers. Policies that promote transparency, and/or uniformity of prices make it easier for 
patients to make informed decisions, and for researchers to better understand the tradeoffs 
patients are willing to make. More and better comparative effectiveness research in oncology 
(comparing treatments head-to-head) makes for less ambiguity of treatment options. Open 
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communication between physicians, patients, and all stakeholders about the cost of care in 




Cost plays an important role in oncology care – one that has become harder and harder to 
ignore as evidence mounts that higher costs impact patient outcomes. As we learn more about 





Tables and Figures  
 





*SEER: Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results Program; CAHPS: Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey  
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 Unweighted Weighted 
N 4561 545   
Age, mean (SD) 74.2 (7.6) 70.7 (8.0) 0.162 0.036 
Male Gender 2651 (58.1%) 311 (57.1%) 0.058 0.059 
Race     
   White 3693 (81.0%) 417 (76.5%) 0.164 0.021 
   Black 366 (8.0%) 74 (13.6%) 0.166 0.029 
   Other 274 (6.0%) 17 (3.1%) 0.062 0.002 
   Hispanic 228 (5.0%) 37 (6.8%) 0.092 0.003 
Highest education     
   Some HS, no grad 718 (15.7%) 126 (23.1%) 0.214 0.079 
   HS grad 1239 (27.2%) 153 (28.1%) 0.014 0.093 
   Some college 1097 (24.1%) 138 (25.3%) 0.004 0.010 
   College+ 1304 (28.6%) 104 (19.1%) 0.234 0.014 
   Missing 203 (4.5%) 24 (4.4%) 0.013 0.035 
Marital Status     
   Married 2743 (60.1%) 288 (52.8%) 0.191 0.090 
   Sep/Divorce 309 (6.8%) 75 (13.8%) 0.226 0.120 
   Widowed 768 (16.8%) 78 (14.3%) 0.039 0.030 
   Never Married 354 (7.8%) 49 (9.0%) 0.046 0.006 
   Missing 387 (8.5%) 55 (10.1%) 0.060 0.029 
Rurality     
   Metro 3767 (82.6%) 440 (80.7%) 0.095 0.049 
   High Urban 288 (6.3%) 44 (8.1%) 0.073 0.027 
   Low Urban 421 (9.2%) 44 (8.1%) 0.003 0.011 
   Rural 85 (1.9%) 17 (3.1%) 0.096 0.137 
Smoking Status     
   Every day 278 (6.1%) 44 (8.1%) 0.082 0.068 
   Some Days 162 (3.6%) 33 (6.1%) 0.118 0.043 
   Not at all 4052 (88.8%) 454 (83.3%) 0.156 0.051 
   Missing 69 (1.5%) 14 (2.6%) 0.048 0.061 
Medicaid Dual Eligible 508 (11.1%) 82 (15.0%) 0.224 0.002 
Area-Level (census tract)     
Median Income, mean (SD) 65579 (29564) 60176 (28090) 0.053 0.009 
Pct Blacks, mean (SD) 9.9 (18.0) 14.2 (23.5) 0.146 0.013 
Density, mean (SD) 3549 (5369) 3849 (6360) 0.175 0.022 
Pct Hispanics, mean (SD) 13.5 (16.8) 14.8 (18.7) 0.058 0.006 
Pct High School Only, mean (SD) 26.6 (10.4) 28.0 (10.2) 0.170 0.013 
Pct living below poverty, mean (SD) 12.7 (9.9) 14.9 (10.6) 0.203 0.022 
     
 







 Unweighted Weighted 
Primary Tumor Site at Diagnosis     
   Bladder 197 (4.3%) 24 (4.4%) 0.008 0.060 
   Breast 1171 (25.7%) 142 (26.1%) 0.018 0.035 
   Colorectal 689 (15.1%) 80 (14.7%) 0.007 0.043 
   Lung 634 (13.9%) 82 (15.0%) 0.038 0.033 
   Prostate 1870 (41.0%) 217 (39.8%) 0.045 0.050 
Cancer Stage at Diagnosis     
   Stage I 1358 (29.8%) 174 (31.9%) 0.049 0.029 
   Stage II 2189 (48.0%) 252 (46.2%) 0.045 0.005 
   Stage III 566 (12.4%) 65 (11.9%) 0.020 0.087 
   Stage IV 329 (7.2%) 44 (8.1%) 0.040 0.055 
   Missing 119 (2.6%) 10 (1.8%) 0.038 0.017 
Cancer Grade at Diagnosis     
   Grade 1 453 (9.9%) 55 (10.1%) 0.001 0.032 
   Grade 2 1934 (42.4%) 226 (41.5%) 0.012 0.071 
   Grade 3 1601 (35.1%) 188 (34.5%) 0.026 0.006 
   Grade 4 138 (3.0%) 12 (2.2%) 0.070 0.016 
   Missing 435 (9.5%) 64 (11.7%) 0.090 0.063 
Surgery on Primary Tumor 2844 (62.4%) 345 (63.3%) 0.014 0.006 
Radiation on Primary Tumor 1653 (36.2%) 218 (40.0%) 0.079 0.009 
Months diagnosis to survey, mean (SD) 17.9 (10.5) 17.4 (10.9)   
Comorbidity Count, mean (SD) 5.1 (3.6) 5.9 (3.7) 0.237 0.045 
     
*HS=high school. Standardized mean difference is defined as the difference between the mean of each covariate at 
delay/omission=0 and delay/omission=1 divided by the pooled standard deviation. Weights are inverse probability 
of treatment weights generated from gradient boosted machine prediction models.      
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Table 8. Cox Proportional Hazards Outcome Models Describing the Association between 
Delay/Omission of prescription medication and Mortality 
 
  All-Cause Mortality Cancer-Specific Mortality 
  Logit  GBM Logit  GBM 
Delay or omission 1.36 [1.08,1.72] 1.26 [1.04,1.52] 1.52 [1.09,2.12] 1.54 [1.15,2.07] 
Age at survey 1.05 [1.03,1.06] 1.05 [1.03,1.07] 1.04 [1.01,1.06] 1.04 [1.02,1.07] 
Male 1.56 [1.16,2.11] 1.52 [1.15,2.01] 1.42 [1,2.02] 1.36 [0.97,1.9] 
Race/Ethnicity (Ref=White)       
Black 1.35 [0.75,2.41] 1.19 [0.75,1.89] 0.74 [0.4,1.38] 0.77 [0.44,1.37] 
Other  1.01 [0.63,1.63] 0.93 [0.61,1.42] 0.54 [0.31,0.94] 0.58 [0.34,0.99] 
Hispanic 0.96 [0.66,1.4] 0.74 [0.5,1.09] 0.57 [0.27,1.24] 0.39 [0.16,1] 
Education (Ref=No HS grad)       
HS grad 1.12 [0.85,1.49] 0.87 [0.68,1.12] 0.8 [0.54,1.16] 0.68 [0.48,0.97] 
Some college 0.96 [0.71,1.29] 0.81 [0.63,1.05] 0.7 [0.46,1.06] 0.66 [0.44,0.99] 
College grad 0.95 [0.66,1.36] 0.75 [0.55,1.01] 0.86 [0.53,1.39] 0.7 [0.44,1.12] 
Marital Status (Ref=Married)       
Sep/Divorce 1.19 [0.82,1.74] 1.36 [0.97,1.9] 1.57 [0.9,2.72] 2.01 [1.24,3.28] 
Widowed 1.33 [1.03,1.72] 1.27 [1,1.61] 1.15 [0.78,1.7] 1.05 [0.73,1.51] 
Never Married 1.6 [1.16,2.2] 1.69 [1.29,2.22] 2.26 [1.36,3.75] 2.76 [1.76,4.34] 
Rural/Urban (Ref=Metro)       
High Urban 0.71 [0.44,1.15] 1.08 [0.79,1.47] 0.42 [0.21,0.83] 0.59 [0.35,1] 
Low Urban 1.1 [0.74,1.63] 1.2 [0.87,1.65] 0.68 [0.4,1.17] 0.64 [0.38,1.08] 
Rural 1.13 [0.75,1.71] 1.23 [0.76,1.99] 0.79 [0.41,1.53] 0.8 [0.39,1.63] 
Smoking Status (Ref=Every day)       
Some days 0.98 [0.63,1.52] 0.91 [0.6,1.37] 1.89 [0.93,3.85] 1.45 [0.79,2.63] 
Never 0.84 [0.59,1.19] 0.64 [0.49,0.86] 1.04 [0.6,1.81] 0.67 [0.43,1.05] 
Dual Status 1.3 [0.95,1.79] 1.08 [0.81,1.43] 1.49 [0.92,2.42] 1.27 [0.81,2] 
Cancer (Ref=Bladder)       
Breast 0.84 [0.45,1.56] 0.79 [0.47,1.35] 0.57 [0.27,1.2] 0.6 [0.3,1.18] 
Colorectal 0.96 [0.58,1.57] 0.82 [0.53,1.29] 1.26 [0.68,2.32] 1.13 [0.62,2.04] 
Lung 1.92 [1.15,3.21] 1.84 [1.17,2.88] 2.55 [1.42,4.56] 2.57 [1.48,4.47] 
Prostate 0.42 [0.26,0.69] 0.4 [0.26,0.63] 0.19 [0.09,0.42] 0.2 [0.1,0.41] 
Stage (Ref=Stage I)       
Stage II 1.4 [1.05,1.86] 1.39 [1.09,1.78] 1.52 [0.9,2.57] 1.73 [1.09,2.73] 
Stage III 1.72 [1.25,2.36] 1.98 [1.53,2.57] 4 [2.6,6.16] 4.68 [3.11,7.03] 
Stage IV 4.45 [3.23,6.13] 4.66 [3.43,6.34] 12.5 [7.9,19.8] 13.4 [8.5,21.2] 
Grade (Ref=Grade 1)       
Grade 2 1.03 [0.71,1.49] 1.06 [0.75,1.49] 1.34 [0.72,2.49] 1.42 [0.75,2.68] 
Grade 3 1.08 [0.71,1.65] 1.17 [0.81,1.7] 1.96 [1.06,3.62] 2.09 [1.13,3.88] 
Grade 4 2.19 [1.17,4.09] 1.7 [0.96,3] 3.84 [1.81,8.15] 2.96 [1.37,6.4] 
Time from diagnosis to survey 0.99 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.98,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 
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Comorbid conditions       
0 0.98 [0.49,1.99] 1.11 [0.59,2.07] 1.77 [0.83,3.79] 1.91 [0.93,3.94] 
1-4 1.37 [0.68,2.76] 1.6 [0.87,2.96] 2.15 [1.01,4.58] 2.42 [1.16,5.06] 
5+ 2.42 [1.22,4.78] 2.56 [1.4,4.7] 2.09 [0.97,4.52] 2.47 [1.17,5.19] 
*All estimates are hazard ratios (HR). The first two columns are unweighted. Models are weighted by the average 
treatment effect (ATE) inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW) where treatment is delay/omission of 
prescription medication. N=5,106 for all models.   
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Number at Risk 
 
 12mo 24mo 36mo 48mo 60mo 72mo 84mo 96mo 108mo 120mo 
No delay 4180 3670 3254 2621 2311 1562 1222 807 442 0 
Delay 435 389 348 281 245 169 124 83 48 0 
 
 
*HR= hazard ratio. Charts display the adjusted all-cause and cancer-specific predicted survival for delay/omission 
and no-delay/omission groups weighted by machine learning (GBM) generated inverse probability of treatment 







Figure 12. Adjusted Hazard Ratio Delay/Omission vs. No Delay/Omission, by Cancer Site 
 
 
*Points are hazard ratio (HR) estimates from propensity-adjusted weighted cox proportional hazards models of all-
cause and cancer-specific mortality (GBM models). Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals. Models are stratified 







Machine Learning Methods Background 
Machine learning (ML) methods are a class of mathematical algorithms designed 
primarily to improve prediction in data science. Many different algorithms exist, including a 
class of tree-based algorithms such as CART, Random Forest, and GBM, as well as network-
based algorithms such as Neural or Deep Nets. Because of their natural fit as prediction models, 
many of these algorithms have entered the healthcare space as quality improvement, or rapid 
response applications to help identify events or trends in large data environments.59,60,64,87  
Slowly, the field has entered inference-based research as well.63 Here, tree-based methods 
appear to be the most widely used, and we follow the prior literature in our selection of GBM. It 
is worth noting that it is not always clear which specific algorithm will perform best for a 
particular data structure a priori. We chose GBM because it is a flexible approach that allows for 
a number of different tuning parameters, and has been used somewhat frequently in the medical 
literature to date. An analysis using neural nets or Random forest could be equally valid, though 
we have no indication from prior experience and testing that results would be materially different 
in this case.   
Regression-tree methods split observations into mutually exclusive buckets according to 
a set of predictors. The splits are determined by a measure of statistical improvement, such as 
root mean squared error (RMSE). Each split of single predictor creates a “branch” (the same 
predictor can be split more than once), terminating once a user-defined length is reached, or the 
prediction cannot be ‘improved’ beyond a minimum threshold. Advanced methods such as GBM 
average over many trees to smooth prediction. In the case of GBM, the algorithm uses the 
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residuals (observed minus fitted prediction) from the prior tree to fit a new tree, improving on the 
areas where the fit was poor at each iteration.  
An important consideration for the use of ML algorithms is the difference between 
inference and prediction. Often researchers have a predisposed understanding of underlying 
factors that may be confounding the relationship between two concepts. When possible, 
researchers control for these measures to eliminate spurious associations (with experimental 
design acting as the gold-standard method). The machine, however cannot differentiate between 
the concept of prediction and inference, searching instead simply for covariates that are most 
strongly predictive of the outcome. To guard again this problem, our approach attempts to 
separate the ML and inference problems in separate estimation steps. We use ML algorithms to 
generate the best-fit prediction of delay/omission, focusing on covariates of importance to 
mortality. Separately we use these predictions to generate weights that used in an inference-
based outcomes equation that is not ML-based, and also controls again for mis-specification 
from the first-stage predictions.  
 
Machine Learning Methods Details 
Here we provide a detailed explanation of the steps used in generating predictions using 
the GBM algorithm. All analyses were programed using R v3.5.1 using primarily the “gbm” and 
“caret” packages.  
As part of data preparation we undertook a number of data cleaning steps that help 
improve the fit and validity of the algorithms. First, we split our full data set into “training” 
(75%) and “test” (25%) sets. All algorithms are built on the training portion of the data, and 
tested for final goodness of fit on the held-out testing portion. This process helps to reduce over-
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fitting. Next, we undertook a number of pre-processing steps, including: (1) eliminating any 
variables with essentially zero variance in our sample (mostly AHRQ CCS codes that were rare); 
and (2) normalizing and centering continuous predictors. We also tested for any variables with a 
correlation coefficient of greater than .9, but did not find any in our sample.  
We next performed 5-fold repeated cross-validation across a range of different tuning 
parameters. Cross-validation is a way to help select the optimal rules for the algorithm that 
produces the best fit, while again guarding against overfitting by splitting the dataset into 5 
different ‘folds’ and testing different parameters. The process is then repeated 5 times with 
randomly selected different folds and averaged for final results. The tuning parameters used in 
the GBM algorithm are: (1) depth of interaction, or the number of potential branches an 
individual tree can split into; (2) learning parameter, or the minimum value needed to signify an 
‘improvement’ in model fit when deciding whether to make a split; (3) terminal node size, or the 
minimum number of observations allowed in final mutually exclusive buckets; and (4) number 
of trees, or the total number of iterations the GBM algorithm builds to. Cross-validation 
produced fits based on a finite number of permutations of these tuning parameters, and assessed 
both the area under the receiver operating curve (AUC) percent accuracy as fit statistics. Based 
on this procedure, we selected a final model with the following parameters: Interaction=5, 
learning parameter=.00025, minimum terminal node size=25.  
Because GBM is a recursive algorithm (building on itself), the number of trees can be 
assessed post-hoc by selecting the ‘i’th iteration for goodness of fit. We utilized this feature to 
optimize across a large range of trees, the specific number that minimized the mean standardized 
difference (calculated as the difference, for each individual predictor, between the mean for 
delay/omission minus the difference for no delay/omission divided by the standard deviation). 
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Using this approach, we generated 15,000 GBM trees and searched among them for the iteration 
with the lowest MSD.  
The final model was then implemented on the full sample and used to generate 
predictions for use in the IPTW weighted outcome model of mortality.  
 









Table 9. Stratified Estimates by Primary Cancer Site 
 Hazard Ratio LCI UCI 
All-Cause Death    
Bladder 2.07 1.10 3.90 
Breast 1.51 1.01 2.27 
Colorectal 1.35 0.78 2.33 
Lung 1.70 1.24 2.32 
Prostate 1.01 0.68 1.50 
Cancer-Specific Death   
Bladder 2.63 1.35 0.78 
Breast 1.37 0.72 2.63 
Colorectal 2.00 0.87 4.60 
Lung 1.66 1.16 2.38 






CHAPTER 4: SOCIETAL IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL BURDEN: A 
SIMULATION MODEL OF WOMEN WITH HER2+ BREAST CANCER 
 
Overview 
Background: Financial burden caused by out-of-pocket medical expense can have a 
profound impact on treatment decisions, quality of life, and downstream outcomes in cancer 
patients. Despite significant research highlighting the effects of financial burden, there is limited 
evidence of the societal impact, or of the value of interventions to reduce its likelihood.  
Objective: To estimate the total societal impact of financial burden (costs and outcomes) 
in a HER2+ breast cancer (BC) setting, evaluating hypothetical programs to reduce out-of-pocket 
cost (OOPC). 
Methods: We built a microsimulation model estimating discounted costs and outcomes 
over 10 years in a cohort of 10,000 women with HER2+ BC. We introduced financial burden a 
behavioral and/or psychological variable affecting costs, quality of life, and mortality. The model 
was populated using data from the published literature, data estimating the reduction in financial 
burden associated with reducing prescription drug costs to patients. Interventions, modeled after 
the existing low-income subsidy, reduced of OOPC by percent Federal Poverty Level (FPL). 
Average total costs and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) were compared across interventions, 
and scenario and probabilistic sensitivity analyses were explored. 
Results: Without intervention, the total 10-year discounted total cost of care was 
$196,027 per person and the total discounted QALYs were 6.3. If the total prescription 
medication OOPC were entirely eliminated, we estimated up to 1.1 additional years in perfect 
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health gained per patient over 10 years. An intervention providing OOPC reduction to persons 
under 150% of FPL had an estimated an incremental cost per QALY gained of $36,633 
($56,746/QALY gained for 400% FPL, and $72,938/QALY gained for the full population). In 
probabilistic sensitivity, targeting 150% FPL yielded an ICER below $100,000/QALY gained in 
98% of simulations and targeting the full population yielded an ICER below $100,000/QALY 
gained in 80% of simulations. 
Conclusion: We found evidence that targeted reduction of OOPC for prescription 
medication may provide significant value at the societal level in a HER2+ BC population. This 
value is at least on par with, if not greater than a number of current pharmacologic treatments, 




In the last 10 to 15 years, individual-level financial burden resulting from the cost of 
medical care has been the subject of considerable research and commentary.8,45,48  Dubbed 
“financial toxicity” in cancer, this type of burden relates to the material, psychological, and 
behavioral response to the cost of recommended medical care.37 Amidst a period of significant 
health policy change and debate, how patients experience and react to cost is integral to any 
future solutions. 
Within cancer, a growing literature has focused on the prevalence of financial burden, as 
well as a limited set of associative studies relating burden to outcomes.6,69,88  Population-based 
estimates suggest that financial burden may be a concern for up to 30-50% of cancer patients, 
across a range of different definitions.46,83 The resulting effects from this burden may include: 
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treatment delay or discontinuation9, meaningful reductions to quality of life46, and even increased 
risk of mortality via an association with bankruptcy.34,35 Importantly, not all patients experience 
financial burden the same. Minority and low-income populations may be at increased risk, and 
may benefit disproportionately from programs that reduce cost.31,32,70 
Missing from the policy debate regarding cost burden has been a systematic, quantitative 
projection of the impact cost to individuals may have at the population level. Without using 
current literature estimates to project an expected attributable societal loss due to cost burden, it 
is difficult to determine the level and target of appropriate intervention. In this study, we build a 
microsimulation model intended to estimate societal costs and outcomes for individuals living 
with cancer and responding to individual cost burden.  
We focus on a case study of women with early-stage HER2+ breast cancer. Breast cancer 
is the most prevalent cancer among women, and HER2+ disease represents approximately 15% 
of newly diagnosed breast cancer cases.89 Clinical treatment recommendations in this setting 
include a combination of surgery, radiation, and the targeted monoclonal antibody, trastuzumab, 
each of which have shown to be effective in randomized controlled studies.90 Trastuzumab in 
particular, can be costly, relative to other breast cancer treatments adding to the overall patient 
cost burden, but has shown to be cost-effective at the societal level.91   
This setting – one with effective but potentially expensive treatment options – offers a 
good case study to quantify the societal impact of financial burden by simulating the effect of 
full or partial reduction of out-of-pocket cost (OOPC) to patients. Specifically, we focus OOPC 
associated with prescription drugs, where some of the best data are available. Within the model, 
we conceptualize financial burden as affecting costs and outcomes in two primary ways. First, as 
a direct quality of life decrement as measured in the published literature; and second as 
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associated with an increased risk of mortality resulting from delaying or omitting prescription 
drugs due to cost.92 The primary goal of this study is to apply these consequences to a population 
with HER2+ breast cancer over a set period of time, and to evaluate potential gains associated 
with shifting the OOPC of prescription medication away from patients at different eligibility 
thresholds. A secondary goal for this analysis is to provide an example of building an often 




To better understand the impact patient cost burden in a population of women with 
HER2+ breast cancer, we built a dynamic microsimulation model. The model predicts total 
cancer costs and outcomes for a hypothetical cohort of 10,000 women newly diagnosed with 
HER2+ breast cancer, followed for 10 years. Individuals experience ‘financial burden’ in the 
simulation, and measure costs, mortality, and quality of life, compared to scenarios with 
interventions designed to reduce OOPC. We examine the societal perspective for all primary 
analyses. In building and describing the model we used the Consolidated Health Economic 
Evaluation Reporting (CHEERs) checklist for decision science modeling as a guide for best 
practice.93 
 Throughout, for the purpose of this model, we define ‘cost burden’ as a phenomenon 
associated with the OOPC of prescription medications only. These are where our data are 
strongest and where we are able to make the most direct claims about efficacy of interventions. 
That said, we acknowledge financial burden is certainly not restricted to prescription drugs (and 
is indeed often a culmination of the total out-of-pocket medical expenses). We account for this in 
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the probability of experiencing financial burden, but overall, we believe a focus on prescription 
drug financial burden represents a ‘conservative’ estimate compared to one accounting for all 
sources of financial burden.  
 
Model structure 
The model is characterized as an individual-level microsimulation model that tracks 
individuals over time, monthly for 10 years. In each month of the simulation, individuals are 
exposed to multiple ‘risks’ as a function of their current health and financial status and time. The 
model contains two main modules (i.e., series of risk equations) that affect each other and 
determine individual outcomes in each time period: a disease state module and a financial burden 
module (Figure 14).  
As part of the disease state module, individuals exist at each time point in “Treatment,” 
“Remission,” or “Death”. These states are intended to represent, broadly, phases of care where 
individuals would be expected to receive more or less intensive health care services. All 
individuals enter the model after diagnosis, on treatment and transition to remission, if 
successful, in 12-15 months. Once in remission, individuals have a probability of disease 
recurrence, and re-entering treatment, based on published estimates of progression (see more in 
Data section, below).94 From both treatment and remission, individuals have a time-varying risk 
of death (an absorbing characteristic from which individuals may not return).  
Also in the disease state module, the model tracks the number of courses of treatment an 
individual has received, a proxy for progression of disease. At each new course of treatment (up 
to a maximum of 4), the risk of mortality and disease progression increase by applying a relative 
multiplier (hazard ratio) to the baseline hazard rate. In a setting without toxicity, individuals have 
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a risk of disease progression or death as a function of time and the number of prior courses of 
treatment at each time point until the end of the model time frame, or death.   
Financial burden is also tracked for each individual at each point in time as a function of 
income (percent of the Federal Poverty Line [FPL]; see technical supplement for detailed and 
alternative assumptions). We assume financial burden is more prevalent during treatment 
periods, shifting the financial burden risk curve down during remission. Following the literature, 
we differentiate between two types of financial burden: behavioral and psychological.37 We 
conceptualized psychological burden as a unit decrement to quality of life in accordance with the 
literature. At each point in time individuals, based on their income levels, have a probability of 
experiencing psychological burden. Separately, we model a person’s behavioral response to cost 
burden as delay or omission of prescription medication.9,51 Operationally, individuals 
experiencing behavioral burden are fed back through the disease state module with an increased 
risk of disease progression and mortality.  
To each time period we apply general cost and utility estimates sourced from the 
literature based on their current disease state, number of prior courses of treatment, and financial 
burden status. These are total and utility estimates meant to represent the average cost of care in 
a given disease state. As noted above, all individuals experiencing financial burden receive a 
decrement to utility based on estimates of the difference in quality of life from the literature, 
mapped to the health-state utility domain.46,95 Those exhibiting a behavioral response (delaying 
or omitting medication) also have a negative cost associated with the expected reduction in 
prescription medication expenditure. All costs are presented in 2018 US dollars and utilities as 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) over time. Costs and QALYs are discounted at 3% annually 





Data used to populate the model come primarily from published literature sources (Table 
10). A cohort of women enter the model with income levels corresponding to the US average 
household income distribution, assigned randomly.97 Baseline risk of death and disease 
progression are taken from a Weibull parametric approximation of 10-year follow-up data in 
controlled trials of trastuzumab, standard of care pharmacologic treatment given to HER2+ BC 
patients.94  
Estimates of financial burden vary considerably in the literature. We used primary data 
from the Medical Panel Expenditure Survey (MEPS) 2016 Cancer Supplement which asks about 
psychological burden for cancer patients to generate estimates of the probability of financial 
burden, by income level.97 We varied these assumptions considerably in sensitivity analyses. The 
increased risk of mortality associated with behavioral financial burden (delaying or omitting 
medication) was gathered from an unpublished propensity analysis of the impact of delaying or 
omitting treatment on all-cause mortality.98 Additional details are provided in the technical 
supplement. 
Health state costs and utilities were rolled into monthly averages (2018 USD). We used 
cost data from a recent analysis of the total cost of care for breast cancer patients by stage, in 
early and continuing phases of care.99 Utilities by stage of disease were used as a proxy for 
disease progression states in the model, ranging from 0.95 in early stages to 0.4 for end-stage 
disease.100 We also apply a last year of life cost representing considerable cost associated with 
the final year of life and consistent with patterns of cost described in the literature.11,101 The 
utility decrement associated with financial burden was taken from published work highlighting 
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the adjusted difference in quality of life associated with financial burden.46 The negative cost 
applied to individuals experiencing behavioral financial burden is calculated as the average total 
prescription drug expenditures for cancer patients using publicly available data from the Medical 
Panel Expenditure Survey (MEPS).97 Without good data on which to base our estimates, we omit 
non-mortality related effects of delaying or forgoing prescription medication (e.g. emergency 
department visits, other healthcare utilization, comorbidity). Again, we expect this decision to 
produce conservative results (favoring no intervention or minimal financial burden impact).  
 
Interventions and Analyses 
Interventions designed to reduce the cost of medical expenses are scattered and vary 
considerably in scope. We considered a series of hypothetical interventions modeled loosely 
after the joint Medicare/Medicaid low-income subsidy (LIS) program, which significantly 
reduces the cost of prescription medication for beneficiaries up to 150% FPL. Our hypothetical 
interventions consider programs providing a similar benefit to LIS that expand or contract 
eligibility from 50% FPL up to the full population. We chose this model largely due to its 
success, longevity, and scale, as well as data on its effectiveness in this setting.  
Specifically, we used estimates of the reduction in delay/omission of prescription 
medication due to cost (our primary measure of effectiveness) from a working paper comparing 
individuals using the LIS to those who do not.102 That work found up to 75% reduction in the 
likelihood of delay or omission of prescription medication for patients using the LIS program. 
Also based on results from the working paper, we implemented a sliding scale of effectiveness 
for interventions based on income relative to (FPL), generally with higher FPL experiencing 
reduced effectiveness of reductions in prescription medication costs (see technical supplement 
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for additional details, Figure A2). At the societal level, we assume no cost to shifting patient cost 
responsibility (the cost of the medication, whether paid by the patient or a 3rd party is net-zero to 
society), but do consider a potential demand response for prescription medication (i.e., patients 
are more likely to fill prescriptions of all types when exposed to little/no cost sharing). We scaled 
these demand response costs to the size of the target population in interventions (only applied to 
proportion of the population expected to receive intervention).103–105 
In our primary analyses we compare a simulated setting with no protections for financial 
burden to hypothetical interventions targeting differing levels of income eligibility. Specifically, 
we compared a scenario of no protections to programs targeting: (1) 150% FPL; (2) 400% FPL; 
and (3) the full population. We divided incremental costs by incremental outcomes to produce a 
cost per QALY gained, with the no protections scenario as referent. In sensitivity analyses we 
assessed outcomes along a scale of FPL ranging from 50 to 800 in increments of 50. The model 
and all analyses were programed in R v3.5.2.106 
 
Sensitivity/Scenario Analyses 
We undertook a number of deterministic and probabilistic sensitivity analyses to test the 
assumptions in our model. A considerable amount of uncertainty surrounds parameters 
associated with the probability of financial burden, as well as the effectiveness of reducing the 
cost of prescription medication to select sub-populations. We undertook a wide range of 
deterministic sensitivity analyses to vary these parameters. See the technical supplement for a 
detailed explanation and graphical representation of the analyses performed. In addition, we 
conducted a number of scenario analyses to test the range of our base estimates, including: 
further reducing the probability of financial burden in remission, doubling/halving the quality of 
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life decrement to financial burden, reducing the price elasticity for prescription medication to 0, 
adding a fixed/administrative cost to interventions, and varying the rate of discount.  
In probabilistic sensitivity analyses we varied costs, utilities, and effectiveness 
parameters (HRs) as well as parameters which govern the probability of financial burden in each 
time period and the distribution of financial burden type (psychological vs. behavioral). In 
general, we modeled uncertain costs using gamma distributions, uncertain probabilities and 
utilities as beta distributions, and uncertain relative measures (e.g., HRs) as lognormal 
distributions.107 Distributions applied to each parameter are presented in the technical 
supplement (Table 14). We conducted 1000 probabilistic simulations comparing primary 
analysis scenarios and plot in the incremental costs and benefit on the Cartesian plane.   
 
Results 
We built a cohort of 10,000 simulated newly diagnosed women with HER2+ breast 
cancer. In base models, all-cause survival at the end of 10 years was 73.2%. Without protections 
from OOPC, the total 10-year discounted cost of care was $196,027 per person and the total 
discounted QALYs were 6.3 (Table 11). Reducing the likelihood of financial burden to zero for 
the entire population resulted in a gain of up to 1.1 additional years in perfect health per patient 
over 10 years, or with an estimate of 30,000 women newly diagnosed with HER2+ breast cancer 
each year, a societal burden of 33,000 life years in perfect health lost.  
As noted above, our base-case results assumed effectiveness estimates between a 75% 
and 25% reduction in the probability delaying or omitting prescription medication (behavioral 
response), based on individual income level. An intervention providing OOPC reduction to 
persons under 150% of FPL increased total discounted QALYs by 0.37 at an incremental cost of 
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$13,572, for an incremental cost per QALY gained (ICER) of $36,633. An intervention reducing 
OOPC for individuals at or below 400% FPL yielded an ICER of $56,746 per QALY gained. 
Providing the same benefit to the full population, however, returned a somewhat less efficient 
$72,938/QALY gained.  
Using an efficiency frontier, we plotted the incremental gains associated with 
interventions covering marginally more of the target population, by FPL (Figure 15). Each point 
represents a different scenario, and the decreasing slope of the line between points represent 
increasingly inefficient intervention points (diminishing returns). Each point compares the 
desired scenario with the intervention before it, ordered by FPL – in this way representing the 
marginal cost of purchasing benefit at each point. Bracketing primary results, are one-way 
sensitivity bands (dotted lines) representing the high and low 95% CI of effectiveness estimates 
(reduction of delay or omission to prescription medication). At 150% FPL the ICER ranges from 
$28,800 (upper 95% CI) to $88,974 (lower 95% CI) when compared to no intervention. As the 
intervention eligibility threshold increases, however, each additional dollar used to purchase 
better outcomes becomes more expensive. Relative to interventions targeting 150% FPL, 
covering 400% FPL results in an ICER of $98,331 per QALY gained. Relative to the benefit at 
400% FPL, a policy maker would need to be willing to pay more than $200,000 per QALY 
gained to recommend targeting the full population. We also tested alternative effectiveness 
assumptions and plotted the frontier in increments of 50 from 0 to 800% FPL with consistent 
results (technical supplement). These alternative effectiveness assumptions are consistent with 




Scenario and Sensitivity Analyses 
We conducted a range of deterministic scenario analyses to test various assumptions in 
the model (Table 12). One of the more sensitive parameters is the quality of life decrement 
associated with financial burden. When halved, base-case ICER estimates increase to 
$72,808/QALY gained for covering up to 150% FPL and $93,408/QALY gained to cover the full 
population. When the quality of life estimates associated with reductions in financial burden is 
doubled, all coverage levels drop below $50,000/QALY gained. Cancer and non-cancer drug 
price elasticity (demand response) also has a major impact on efficiency estimates. If we assume 
no change in behavior associated with protections against prescription medication out-of-pocket 
cost, interventions become nearly cost saving and dominant. Finally, a one-time fixed 
administrative program initiation cost of $40 million (assumption, 2018 projected LIS fixed 
cost), has only marginal impact on the ICER estimates.  
Probabilistic sensitivity analyses varied 31 different input parameters across a range of 
plausible values in 1000 simulations. In a scatterplot displaying incremental costs and effects, 
compared to no intervention, all simulations appear in the ‘upper-right’ quadrant – i.e., more 
costly and more effective than the referent (Figure 16). In 98% of simulations an intervention to 
reduce the cost of prescription medication targeting up to 150% FPL was less than 
$100,000/QALY gained. Targeting the full population produced ICERs less than 
$100,000/QALY gained in 80% of simulations.   
 
Discussion 
Reducing financial burden in cancer can have profound impacts on quality of life and 
other cancer health outcomes. To date, evidence has concentrated on demonstrating the 
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individual-level associations between cost and outcomes. In this study, we apply some of these 
associations to a population cohort of women with HER2+ breast cancer. Our goal was to 
quantify the cost and benefit tradeoffs to reducing financial burden from prescription drug costs, 
using metrics which allow for comparison against more traditional interventions. In general, 
significantly reducing the cost of prescription medication in this population provides a cost-
effective strategy to improving health at the societal level – especially for low-income 
populations. 
Previous economic evaluations have found treatment in the HER2+ breast cancer setting 
to be cost-effective at conventional willingness to pay thresholds, though none consider financial 
burden in their analyses.91 Notably, the financial burden literature has suggested that the absolute 
OOPC dollar amount may not be a sufficient predictor of burden and that even relatively small 
cost sharing can cause financial distress and/or alter patient behavior.37,108 We believe this setting 
is an ideal case-study for proof of concept in modeling financial burden, especially given recent 
evidence relating financial burden, prescription delay/omission, and increased mortality.98,102  
Our approach could be conceptualized as an attempt to model a form of imperfect 
adherence. Much of the economic evaluation literature assumes effectiveness from intervention 
at perfect adherence (or at levels reported from clinical trials). Outside of controlled setting, 
individuals respond to many constraints, including cost. This approach offers an example of how 
to build onto a standard economic model in the cancer setting by incorporating an individual’s 
behavioral response to high cost prescription medication.  
Our primary results suggest significant population-level differences in outcomes in the 
HER2+ BC population attributable to financial burden from drug costs. Targeted reduction of 
financial burden through interventions that limit OOPC for patients produced value on par with 
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newly developed oncology drugs.109 We are not aware of other studies that seek to identify or 
quantify financial burden in this way. We believe this approach could be used to incorporate the 
negative effects associated with financial burden into a more traditional comparative and cost-
effectiveness evaluation.   
Our results also suggest that tailored/targeted programs (e.g., by FPL) may provide 
greater benefit at similar cost when compared to blanket interventions targeting the full 
population. These findings are built on assumptions regarding reduced efficacy at higher levels 
of income, but relatively robust to different permutations of those assumptions. There is some 
support for this assumption in the literature. Evidence has suggested different populations 
experience financial burden differently, including low-income populations, or racial/ethnic 
minorities.31,32,70 Still, we are careful to highlight these results as largely exploratory. 
A number of current mechanisms exist to reduce OOPC burden, including those targeted 
at reducing patient cost for drugs. We modeled our interventions after the Medicare/Medicaid 
LIS program which offers low-income Medicare enrollees (at or below 150% FPL) with near 
zero prescription medication. Results from this analysis demonstrate a potential societal benefit 
to adjusting the eligibility threshold, depending on willingness to pay, but we are careful to note 
that our results are specific to the targeted HER2+ breast cancer population. Another example of 
nationally organized legislation used to help support the cost of prescription drugs is the 340b 
program. This program, which is designed to offer discounted medication to hospitals treating 
under-served populations, has been the subject of recent controversy over the misuse of 
appropriated funds.86 Pharmaceutical couponing or foundational support is also an important 
mechanism for many individual patients. Couponing also has controversy, with critics arguing it 
drives up prices at the societal level.73 Finally, financial assistance is often available through 
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localized programs at hospitals or care centers. These programs can connect people with a 
diversity of resources, or provide a more tailored form of assistance, such as financial navigation, 
and have been shown to be effective in pilot studies.110 All of the existing programs that provide 
prescription drug support to cancer patients work differently and on different scales. More 
research is needed to provide data on their effectiveness at reducing financial burden in order to 
facilitate more targeted and specific economic evaluation of alternatives.  
This work has a number of limitations. One important limitation, is our assumption 
surrounding behavior in response to financial burden (defined here as delaying or omitting 
prescription medication), and the relief from such burden. Patient behavior is inherently difficult 
to predict. Our approach in this model was to err on the conservative side and include for 
interventions expected to reduce OOPC of prescription medication an increased cost associated 
with increased patient demand. Though it may seem hard to imagine demanding ‘more’ cancer 
drug, this cost includes non-cancer drugs, and is supported by a considerable literature.103,104 
More work is needed to better understand the different behaviors associated with increased 
financial strain in cancer patients, including among complementary drugs, and other forms of 
supportive care.  
We also are careful to note that the perspective for this analysis could shape a large 
portion of the discussion surrounding policy interventions that reduce OOPC. From the 
perspective of society, there is ‘net-zero’ cost to shifting payment responsibility. But from the 
perspective of Medicare/Medicaid, or other payers, there is a real (and potentially significant) 
cost to covering prescription drugs. Future work should consider how these results change from 
the perspective of individual payers, and additional research is needed to demonstrate whether 
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increased demand associated with lowered cost-sharing could contribute to cost-savings 
elsewhere (e.g., reduce ED visits, or future complications).  
Another major limitation lies in the nature of model building. The model is an imperfect 
representation of a real-world process and uses data from multiple sources. We employ 
probabilistic sensitivity to provide ranges around uncertain parameters, but cannot be certain that 
we have fully captured the full range of variability in the model parameters, or all possible non-
linear interactions between parameters. Finally, we are limited by data availability specifically 
using estimates that focus on financial burden due to prescription drug costs. Of course, financial 
burden can and does result from medical expense more broadly.111 Individual-level financial 
burden is often a result of accumulating costs from multiple sources. To the extent that burden 
may be different when incorporating different sources, our results may change, though we 
hypothesize only to make the reduction of financial burden more valuable.  
Conclusion 
This work represents the first attempt at quantifying the population-level societal impact 
of known associations between financial burden and outcomes. We find evidence that targeted 
reduction of financial burden via reduced OOPC for prescription medication may provide 
significant value at the societal level in a HER2+ BC population. This value is at least on par 
with, if not greater than a number of current and newly developed oncology treatment options, 





Tables and Figures 
 





*This figure is a graphical depiction of the model. Individuals retain characteristics related to current health state, 
including treatment line (up to 4), remission phase, and death, as well as current financial burden state, including 


































Table 10. Input Parameters 
 
Parameter Base-case Value Source 
Model Structure     
Time frame 10 years   
Time step Months   
Simulated individuals 10,000   
Discount rate (costs & utility) 0.03 Sanders et al.  
     
State Transitions    
Overall Survival (base) Weibull Perez et al. 
Disease Progression (base) Weibull Perez et al. 
HR Treatment Course 1:2 1.36 SEER-CAHPS* 
HR Treatment Course 1:3 2.69 SEER-CAHPS* 
HR Treatment Course 1:4+ 4.68 SEER-CAHPS* 
     
Financial Burden    
Base financial burden Multi* MEPS 2016 Cancer Supplement 
Ratio of Behav vs. Psych  0.5 Assumption, SEER-CAHPS* 
HR, Mortality 1.51 SEER-CAHPS* 
HR, Progression 2.08 Perez et al. 
     
Costs (monthly, unless specified)    
Initial treatment year 6843 Blumen et al. 
2nd tx course 6843 Blumen et al. 
3rd tx course 9181 Blumen et al. 
4th+ tx course 10585 Blumen et al. 
Remission 357 Blumen et al. 
Last year of life 150000 Chastek, et al. 
Forgone medical expense due to 
financial burden 54,000 Garrison et al. (cost trastuzumab) 
     
Utilities    
Initial treatment year 0.9 Kim et al. 
2nd tx course 0.731 Kim et al. 
3rd tx course 0.496 Kim et al. 
4th+ tx course 0.352 Kim et al. 
Remission 0.95 Kim et al. 
Finanical burden decrement -0.06 Zafar et al., Sullivan et al. 
     
Interventions    
Effectiveness Multi* SEER-CAHPS* 
Startup/admin costs 0 Assumption 
Price elasticity -0.2  Goldman et al. 
Non-cancer rx costs 3440 MEPS 2016 Cancer Supplement 
tx=treatment; HR=hazard ratio   




Table 11. Average Base-Case Costs and Outcomes by Intervention Scenario 
 
 Total Incremental Gains (vs. No Intervention) 
 Costs QALYs Inc. Costs Inc. QALY Cost/QALY 
No Intervention $196,027 6.30 --- --- --- 
Targeting <=150% FPL $209,758 6.67 $13,731 0.37 $37,060 
Targeting Full 
Population $240,409 6.90 $44,383 0.61 $72,938 
      
*Results from a simulation of 10,000 women with HER2+ breast cancer. Targeting <150%FPL refers to interventions that reduce 










*Results from a simulation of 10,000 women with HER2+ breast cancer. Numbers are Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratios 
(ICER) at different intervention pints. FPL legend refers to interventions that reduce the financial burden according to 
effectiveness estimates (see data section above) in individual at or below each level of FPL. Dotted lines represent one-way 








Table 12. Deterministic Scenario Analyses 
  
 
Coverage of 150% FPL 
vs. No Coverage 
Scenario Inc. Costs Inc. QALY Cost/QALY Gained 
Base $13,731  0.37 $37,060  
    
Probability of Financial Toxicity in 
Remission=0 $14,291  0.27 $51,986  
Half financial toxicity QoL decrement $14,052  0.19 $72,808  
Double financial toxicity QoL decrement $14,052  0.73 $19,366  
Price elasticity=0 $154  0.37 $415  
Financial toxicity cost adjustment halved $18,052  0.37 $48,723  
Financial toxicity cost adjustment doubled $13,144  0.37 $35,475  
Intervention fixed/admin costs (10yr)=40m $15,868  0.37 $42,830  
0% Discount, Costs & Utilities $15,872  0.42 $37,584  
5% Discount, Costs & Utilities $13,013  0.34 $38,150  
    
 Coverage of All Individuals 
 vs. No Coverage 




Probability of Financial Toxicity in 
Remission=0 $44,696  0.48 $93,408  
Half financial toxicity QoL decrement $44,383  0.32 $140,629  
Double financial toxicity QoL decrement $44,383  1.19 $37,171  
Price elasticity=0 $535  0.61 $880  
Financial toxicity cost adjustment halved $48,383  0.61 $79,511  
Financial toxicity cost adjustment doubled $42,866  0.61 $70,446  
Intervention fixed/admin costs (10yr)=40m $47,415  0.61 $77,922  
0% Discount, Costs & Utilities $50,552  0.69 $72,957  
5% Discount, Costs & Utilities $40,872  0.56 $72,934  
*Results from a simulation of 10,000 women with HER2+ breast cancer. All parameters remains fixed in deterministic scenario 

















*Results from 1,000 simulations of 10,000 women with HER2+ breast cancer. Grey lines represent willingness to pay thresholds. 
Points to the ‘right’ of each line have incremental cost-effectiveness ratios less than the stated value. FPL_150 represents 
interventions designed reduce financial burden through OOPC reduction to a targeted population at or below 150% of the federal 





Technical Supplement  
 
Probability of financial burden 
The probability of financial burden and its associated reduction during intervention is 
among the more sensitive and more variable parameters in our model. To provide additional 
confidence in our results, we reproduced our finds across a wide range of different assumptions 
regarding financial burden.  
Base-case probability of financial burden were derived from the Cancer Supplement to 
the Medical Panel Expenditure Survey (MEPS) in 2016.97 We pooled results to questions related 
to ‘worry’ about finances, medical bills and income as a result of their cancer treatment to create 
an estimate of the cancer population experiencing financial burden. We then estimated this 
likelihood at different levels of percent Federal Poverty Level (FPL), also contained in MEPS, 
using logistic regression and marginal predicted probabilities. We did not have information about 
financial burden for those in remission vs. treatment phases, but assumed that the probability of 
toxicity would be lower while in remission, shifting the function downward by 50% (and varied 
in deterministic sensitivity analyses to below 10%). Based on unpublished data from the SEER-
CAHPS data suggesting that approximately 14% of individuals report a behavioral response due 
to cost burden, we assumed that half of the total toxicity is behavioral and half is psychological. 
















Assumptions Related to Effectiveness of Intervention (Reduction in financial burden) 
Intervention effectiveness is relatively sparse in this context. Using primary estimates 
from the first paper cited in the previous paper we construct an expected predicted reduction in 
the probability of behavioral financial burden associated with a significant reduction in the cost 
of prescription medication.  
Part of this prior work was a demonstration that effectiveness of an intervention to reduce 
the cost of prescription medication (in this case the LIS), varies by need, or more specifically, 
area-level income measures. Because we do not have good data on how much these should 
measure – or how these area-level measures translate to a direct income measure, such as %FPL, 
we undertook a number of sensitivity analyses (Figure A2). In our base-case assumptions, we 
assumed a linear function between %FPL and % reduction in financial burden – from 75% at 0% 
FPL to 5% at 800% FPL and above. We also tested a decreasing ‘quadratic’ function where the 
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percent effectiveness decreases at a decreasing rate, by % FPL. Next we tested a ‘step’ function 
corresponding to the ATT and ATE estimates from the prior work. This function assumes all 
individuals at or below 150% FPL experience a reduction corresponding to the ATT estimate, 
and all individuals above 150% FPL experience a reduction corresponding to the ATE estimate. 
Finally, we tested upper and lower bound estimates from the 95% CI of estimates in the 
unpublished work.   
 





Sensitivity Results from Alternative Assumptions of effectiveness 
 
Here we graphically present results (as an efficiency frontier) under alternative 
assumptions of effectiveness. High and low curves represent 95% CI from the effectiveness 
estimates in unpublished working paper references above. The linear model uses our base-case 
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assumption of a linear decline in effectiveness from ~75% at 0% FPL to 5% at 800+% FPL. The 
quadratic model is similar to the linear, with an extra quadratic term accounting for effectiveness 
that decreases at an increasing rate at higher levels of FPL. Our read from these sensitivity 
results, is that our primary conclusions are largely consistent with the findings here. To avoid 












Table 13. Effectiveness Sensitivity Results 
 
[This same information is contained in Figure 19 Above] 
 
FPL Model Costs QALYs Inc.Costs Inc.QALYs ICER 
0 Base $196,027 6.30 $0 0.00 NaN 
50 Linear $201,827 6.50 $5,800 0.21 $27,857 
100 Linear $206,056 6.60 $10,029 0.30 $33,209 
150 Linear $209,758 6.67 $13,731 0.37 $37,060 
200 Linear $214,214 6.72 $18,187 0.43 $42,492 
250 Linear $217,820 6.76 $21,793 0.47 $46,827 
300 Linear $221,158 6.79 $25,131 0.50 $50,404 
350 Linear $224,188 6.82 $28,161 0.53 $53,458 
400 Linear $227,282 6.85 $31,256 0.55 $56,746 
450 Linear $229,968 6.86 $33,941 0.57 $59,692 
500 Linear $232,217 6.88 $36,190 0.58 $62,236 
550 Linear $234,473 6.89 $38,446 0.59 $64,855 
600 Linear $236,089 6.90 $40,062 0.60 $66,692 
650 Linear $237,497 6.90 $41,470 0.61 $68,534 
700 Linear $238,731 6.90 $42,704 0.61 $70,306 
750 Linear $239,496 6.90 $43,469 0.61 $71,472 
800 Linear $240,409 6.90 $44,383 0.61 $72,938 
50 Low $201,339 6.40 $5,312 0.10 $50,635 
100 Low $205,299 6.45 $9,272 0.15 $60,802 
150 Low $208,915 6.48 $12,888 0.19 $69,181 
200 Low $213,175 6.51 $17,148 0.22 $79,611 
250 Low $216,687 6.53 $20,660 0.23 $88,216 
300 Low $219,963 6.55 $23,937 0.25 $95,517 
350 Low $222,942 6.56 $26,915 0.26 $101,875 
400 Low $225,991 6.57 $29,965 0.28 $108,567 
450 Low $228,615 6.58 $32,588 0.28 $114,506 
500 Low $230,816 6.59 $34,789 0.29 $119,591 
550 Low $233,055 6.59 $37,028 0.30 $124,883 
600 Low $234,654 6.60 $38,627 0.30 $128,586 
650 Low $236,044 6.60 $40,017 0.30 $132,287 
700 Low $237,266 6.60 $41,239 0.30 $135,833 
750 Low $238,028 6.60 $42,001 0.30 $138,160 
800 Low $238,946 6.60 $42,919 0.30 $141,135 
50 High $202,032 6.57 $6,005 0.27 $21,899 
100 High $206,383 6.69 $10,356 0.40 $26,007 
150 High $210,231 6.78 $14,204 0.49 $29,125 
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200 High $214,818 6.86 $18,791 0.56 $33,271 
250 High $218,490 6.91 $22,463 0.62 $36,466 
300 High $221,931 6.96 $25,904 0.66 $39,183 
350 High $225,021 6.99 $28,994 0.70 $41,509 
400 High $228,119 7.03 $32,092 0.73 $43,872 
450 High $230,844 7.05 $34,817 0.76 $46,048 
500 High $233,110 7.07 $37,083 0.77 $47,923 
550 High $235,403 7.08 $39,376 0.79 $49,893 
600 High $237,027 7.10 $41,000 0.80 $51,198 
650 High $238,442 7.10 $42,415 0.81 $52,527 
700 High $239,685 7.11 $43,658 0.81 $53,832 
750 High $240,457 7.11 $44,430 0.81 $54,704 
800 High $241,373 7.11 $45,346 0.81 $55,790 
50 Quad $201,827 6.50 $5,800 0.21 $27,830 
100 Quad $206,077 6.60 $10,050 0.31 $32,832 
150 Quad $209,816 6.67 $13,789 0.38 $36,364 
200 Quad $214,310 6.74 $18,283 0.44 $41,290 
250 Quad $217,931 6.78 $21,904 0.49 $45,098 
300 Quad $221,314 6.82 $25,287 0.52 $48,257 
350 Quad $224,364 6.85 $28,337 0.56 $50,910 
400 Quad $227,466 6.88 $31,439 0.58 $53,751 
450 Quad $230,181 6.90 $34,154 0.61 $56,323 
500 Quad $232,432 6.92 $36,405 0.62 $58,520 
550 Quad $234,707 6.93 $38,680 0.64 $60,865 
600 Quad $236,317 6.94 $40,290 0.65 $62,436 
650 Quad $237,732 6.95 $41,705 0.65 $64,112 
700 Quad $238,967 6.95 $42,940 0.65 $65,748 
750 Quad $239,733 6.95 $43,706 0.65 $66,839 
800 Quad $240,652 6.95 $44,625 0.65 $68,234 
50 Step $201,765 6.49 $5,738 0.20 $28,981 
100 Step $206,015 6.59 $9,988 0.30 $33,777 
150 Step $209,776 6.67 $13,749 0.37 $36,989 
200 Step $214,128 6.71 $18,101 0.41 $43,786 
250 Step $217,669 6.74 $21,642 0.44 $48,854 
300 Step $221,014 6.77 $24,987 0.47 $53,051 
350 Step $224,039 6.79 $28,012 0.50 $56,373 
400 Step $227,130 6.82 $31,103 0.52 $59,619 
450 Step $229,838 6.84 $33,811 0.54 $62,335 
500 Step $232,096 6.85 $36,069 0.56 $64,490 
550 Step $234,378 6.87 $38,351 0.58 $66,558 
600 Step $236,010 6.89 $39,983 0.59 $67,608 
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650 Step $237,450 6.90 $41,423 0.60 $68,878 
700 Step $238,721 6.90 $42,694 0.61 $70,186 
750 Step $239,500 6.91 $43,474 0.61 $71,058 





Table 14. Probabilistic Sensitivity Input Distributions and Parameters 
 
Model Variable Mean Distribution Parameter1 Parameter2 Parameter3 
HR_tx1:2 1.36 lognormal log(1.36) 0.075  
HR_tx1:3 2.69 lognormal log(2.69) 0.1  
HR_tx1:4 4.68 lognormal log(4.86) 0.12  
HRTtoD 1.51 lognormal log(1.51) 0.236  
HRRtoD 1.51 lognormal log(1.51) 0.236  
HRTtoR 0.48 lognormal log(.48) 0.125  
HRRtoT 2.08 lognormal log(.48) 0.125  
toxbehav 0.5 beta 12 12  
utox -0.06 beta 17 264  
ut1 0.9 beta 80.1 8.9  
ur1 0.95 beta 450 23.7  
urdelay 0.05 beta 9.45 179.55  
udiff12 0.169 beta 9.3 45.8  
udiff23 0.235 beta 8.21 26.7  
udiff34 0.144 beta 35.3 210  
ct1 6843 gamma 1.6 25000 50000 
ct12 1.2 lognormal log(1.2) 0.05  
ct23 969 gamma 1.5 7738  
ct34 1404 gamma 1.9 8900  
cr1 357 gamma 18.3 233  
cr12 1.25 lognormal log(1.25) 0.06  
cr23 1.2 lognormal log(1.2) 0.05  
cr34 1.33 lognormal log(4/3) 0.07  
cylol 15000 gamma 2.5 60000 285000 
cforgone 54,000 gamma 5.78 5882 86000 
penoncancer 1.2 lognormal log(1.2) 0.075  







CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Overview and Context 
 
The findings from this dissertation, across three aims, tell a relatively consistent story 
relating to financial burden from prescription medication and its effects on cancer patients. First, 
we observed substantial reduction (between 25 and 75%) in the likelihood of delay or omission 
of prescription medication among low-income subsidy Medicare enrollees relative to persons not 
on the LIS. Since the LIS provides substantial reduction in the cost of prescription medication, 
we attribute this finding largely to an expected lower cost for drugs. Confidence in this result is 
bolstered by a range of qualitatively consistent sensitivity analyses and a robust balancing 
strategy that seeks to control for underlying differences between LIS and non-LIS populations 
using machine learning techniques. We further observed heterogeneity in the ability of the LIS 
program to reduce delay or omission of prescription medication among the ‘treated’ (LIS 
participants) and the full sample, suggesting that individuals at higher need based on 
income/asset eligibility may be more likely to benefit from a reduction in prescription drug costs.  
 Next, we sought to estimate the effect of this delay or omission of prescription 
medication due to cost on all-cause and cancer-specific mortality. Again, we find compelling 
evidence to affirm that cost-related burden affects patients negatively. The hazard for all-cause 
death was approximately 25% higher for those reporting delay or omission of prescription 
medication and more than 50% higher for cancer-specific death. Characteristics that predict 
delay or omission of prescription medication were used in machine learning algorithms to 
improve balance between groups. Notably, we found important differences when stratifying by 
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primary cancer site. Patients with bladder breast and lung cancers exhibited the strongest 
association between delay or omission of prescription medication and mortality, while prostate 
cancer patients showed almost no difference in all-cause death.  
 Finally, we use results from the prior two aims on the effectiveness of potential policy 
interventions mimicking the LIS to reduce OOPC burden and the consequences of high cost 
burden to simulate the societal-level impact in a specific population: HER2+ breast cancer. In a 
microsimulation model of 10,000 women followed for 10 years, we found evidence to suggest 
substantial loss associated with financial burden (more than a year of perfect health lost per 
person). We also modeled hypothetical interventions targeting populations at differing levels of 
income, proxied by the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). Covering more of the population was more 
costly, with diminishing returns to health (assumptions from evidence in Aim 1). Across a range 
of sensitivity and variable assumptions, covering 150% of FPL (when compared to no coverage) 
provides value significantly below commonly accepted willingness to pay thresholds, and on par 
with many traditional oncologic treatment regimens. Covering the full population appears 
marginally less efficient, but arguably still under a $100,000 per QALY gain threshold when 
compared to no intervention.  
It is important to put these results into context. Estimates of the difference in delay or 
omission of prescription medication for LIS vs. non-LIS beneficiaries are consistent with a larger 
literature which relates cost exposure to adherence and use outcomes. If anything, our estimates 
may be marginally larger than some of the existing literature that shows a 20-50% reduction in 
adherence-related outcomes due to cost.9,17 We attribute this departure from the literature partly 
to the self-reported measure used in this study which captures both delay and omission – not 
directly relatable to other studies calculating only ‘adherence’ using proportion of days covered 
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(among users) in claims. Few studies have analyzed the effect of financial burden on mortality. 
The most directly relatable study used a pathway through bankruptcy and finds estimates larger 
than those we estimate here.35 Bankruptcy, however, is likely to be an extreme form of financial 
burden, especially compared to the pathway used for our study (delay or discontinuation of 
medication) which could contribute to the difference. We are not aware of any study that 
examines cancer-specific mortality, suggesting the need for more research to confirm these 
associative findings. We are also not aware of any study that seeks to quantify the societal 
burden, though within the context of economic evaluation in cancer our findings compare 
favorably to a number of more traditional cancer therapeutics.  
 
Implications for Policy 
There are several important implications for policy from this work. First, this work 
provides further evidence of an association between financial burden and adverse health 
outcomes to cancer patients. In this case, failing to take prescription medication because of cost 
can lead to significant mortality risks – an important but intuitive finding. Policy-wise this 
finding suggests that programs which promote reduction in cost burden to individuals can 
improve health, even for ‘hard’ clinical outcomes, such as death.  
This work also demonstrates that programs that limit the OOPC costs of prescription 
medication to patients can produce significant reductions in the likelihood of delay or omission 
of those prescriptions by patients. Importantly, we observe significant heterogeneous effects by 
population income. Estimates that seek to balance groups to look like the full sample population 
were 2-3 times less than those balanced to look like the ‘targeted’ population (here, low-income 
individuals). The difference is substantial; low-income individuals may experience up to a 75% 
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reduction in the likelihood of delay or omission, while average effects across the full population 
were closer to 25%. The suggestion for policy is that not all populations may not benefit equally 
from cost-savings programs. Targeted interventions may produce the most efficient outcomes.  
From simulations, we also demonstrate that the value associated with targeted 
interventions is likely to be favorable (cost-effective) when compared to no intervention in a 
HER2+ breast cancer population. Against commonly cited willingness to pay values that allow 
researchers to compare across intervention types and disease areas, the value of a program to 
reduce the cost of prescription medication to low-income individual (like the LIS) compares 
favorably to existing clinical cancer interventions. Though the estimates become considerably 
less precise, with many unknowns, there may also be evidence to suggest programs targeting 
low-middle income individuals (e.g., 150-400% FPL) provide good value as well. Notably, our 
estimates focus on the burden associated with prescription drug costs only; the societal benefit to 
reductions in out-of-pocket cost burden could be greater when accounting for all types of 
medical expense.  
Overall, this work provides evidence to support targeted policy interventions that reduce 
the financial burden to individuals with cancer. The LIS, upon which a number of these estimates 
are based, provides a strong and efficient base solution for Medicare Beneficiaries. But not all 
cancer patients are eligible. Those on private insurance, uninsured, or not meeting income/asset 
thresholds may also be at increased risk of delay or omission of prescription medication, and 
ultimately, death. Expanding eligibility or creating new programs may be viable solutions in 
certain settings. But LIS expansion has limits, and moving forward, it will be important to 





One obvious extension of this work is to continue demonstrate value associated with 
targeted interventions across different populations. We chose HER2+ breast cancer as a proof of 
concept, but many other settings are in need of economic evaluation to help guide policy 
decisions. Moving forward, as interventions take shape, research should also focus on specific 
differences between them, such as the value associated with a national LIS-type program, when 
compared to a local hospital-based patient navigation program, or 340b benefits. Data at the 
moment on these different strategies are sparse, but as solutions are developed, more and more 
information about their effectiveness will lead to an ability to compare and contract programs 
directly. 
 Another important extension of this work would be to differentiate between cancer and 
non-cancer specific medication in the estimates of delay/omission and mortality. Part D claims 
would help to be able to identify specific sets of drugs that different patient groups may be 
receiving – which would allow for a better understanding of where clinical harm is most 
concentrated. Though our estimates of cancer-specific mortality – higher than those for all-cause 
– may suggest much of the benefit afforded to reduced cost of prescription medication is in 
cancer drugs, these estimates are very imprecise and should require further study to verify 
independently, using Part D claims.   
 Finally, an important critique of the financial burden literature to date is the inability of 
different studies to standardized their measure of ‘burden’. Though qualitative research has 
confirmed the inherently subjective nature of financial burden – individuals may feel burdened 
or affected by different financial circumstances – a lack of standardization makes quantitative 
conclusions challenging to compare across studies. The field should work towards a set of 
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agreed-upon measures, developed with substantial patient and stakeholder input – that would 
allow for future research to build, rather than re-invent each time.    
 In an ever-changing health policy landscape, the cost of care is one constant. The cost to 
patients, the cost to payers, and the cost to society all shape decision making. In this dissertation 
we demonstrate some of the consequences associated with individual patient cost burden, and 
how effective policy may limit negative effects. More and better evidence-based implementation 
of policy to limit overly-burdensome cost exposure for patients could improve cancer health 
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